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ABSTRACT
Research surrounding how much influence the public has on the U.S. Supreme Court
offers conflicting results. Some scholars argue that because the Court is politically insulated it
does not pay much attention to what the public desires when deciding cases. Others suggest the
Court’s decisions reflect prevailing public moods. I join in this debate and argue that public
opinion indirectly influences the Court by motivating key actors to support cases and file briefs,
thereby helping shape the Court’s agenda. When powerful attorneys such as the Solicitor General
or large D.C. law firms are involved in a petition for certiorari, there is a higher likelihood that
these petitions will be granted certiorari. In addition, I argue public attention spurs action among
special interest groups in the form of Amicus curiae briefs and gets the attention of powerful

lawyers and government appointees. Once again, these actions increase the likelihood of a case
being heard on the merits. I use data from social media to determine how much specific issue
areas are being talked about among the American public and build models showing how
increased attention leads to discernible effects on the certiorari process at the U.S. Supreme
Court. I find that the public, albeit indirectly, does have an impact on what petitions are given
more attention by the U.S. Supreme Court. Many have argued that the Court is immune from
public pressure, and these findings give evidence against that argument.
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1
1.1

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Introduction
In January 2010, the Supreme Court made a landmark 5-4 decision in Citizens United v.

FEC where the Court lifted restrictions on campaign contributions for corporations and other
organizations. 1 In November of the same year, the Court accepted a petition for a writ of
certiorari to another campaign finance case, Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC
v. Bennett. 2 In 1998, the Arizona legislature passed a law which gave a flat amount of funding to
candidates running for statewide. The act sets spending limits for participating candidates and
provides them with additional funds if a nonparticipating opponent spends more than the limit
for the office. The act also reduces contribution limits for individuals by 20% to nonparticipating
candidates. Candidates could opt in or out, however, if they opted out, the law stipulated that if
their opponents opted in, the opponent would receive matching funds based on the amounts spent
by private opponents and independent groups against them. Meaning, if one campaign opted out
and an outside group raised and spent more money, their challengers would get an equal amount
in return from the state. In 2008, the Arizona Free Enterprise Club, along with Republican
candidates sued the state. The plaintiffs argued that the law limited the amount of money they
could spend on their own campaigns as well as against their opponents, which constituted a
violation of their free speech. The U.S. District Court agreed with the plaintiffs and found the
1998 Arizona statute unconstitutional. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the district court, finding that the law had a minimal impact on free speech.

1
2

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)
Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721 (2011)
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On August 17th, 2010, the original plaintiffs of the Arizona case petitioned the U.S.
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, hoping the high court would reverse the Ninth Circuit’s
decision. Likely due to the Court’s decision in Citizens United earlier in the year, public attention
toward campaign finance spiked around the same time. 3 Interestingly, the Arizona petition
received five amicus curiae briefs (highly influential and expensive documents) before the Court
made its decision to grant certiorari. In contrast, the much more widely known Citizens United
petition received just one amici brief. After the Court granted the Arizona petition and placed it
on the upcoming docket, the U.S. Solicitor General and many other interest groups also took
interest in the case. The Solicitor General filed a motion to argue on the side of the respondents
to uphold the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, and this motion was granted. In addition, after certiorari
was granted, the petition would receive 38 additional amicus briefs before a final decision was
made. In the end, the Court ruled 5-4 for the petitioners and reversed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling.
Why did the Arizona petition garner such strong attention from interest groups and
government attorneys before the Court placed the petition on its agenda? Why would interest
groups spend hundreds of thousands of dollars preparing amicus curiae briefs for a relatively less
important case when they did not for the much more important Citizens United petition filed less
than a year earlier? I argue that an increase in public attention to an issue area can motivate
important actors who influence the Supreme Court to change their behavior. The more the public
pays attention to an issue area, the more likely interest groups who deal with that issue are going
to become active to show their membership that they are attempting to influence policy. In
addition, I argue the more attention an issue receives, the more likely government attorneys are

The spike of public attention toward Campaign Finance, how I measure it, and how the data was collected, is
discussed in Chapter 3.

3
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to get involved in or directly litigate cases related to the issue to show constituents that they are
working on issues the public cares about.
Understanding why certain petitions are granted certiorari and others are not is of great
importance. Justices’ rulings establish new precedent, and through these decisions the Supreme
Court makes policy. The earliest stage of establishing a new precedent is when the justices
decide which cases the Supreme Court will decide on the merits. Understanding what factors
impact the Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari is important because of the clear link
between this agenda-setting function of the Court and the ultimate decisions of the Court. By
deciding which cases to hear – and which not to hear – the Court crafts its policy agenda. These
decisions carry with them great weight: placing an issue on the Court’s agenda, or leaving it off,
can have important ramifications in both the legal and political arenas.
Petitions granted certiorari have changed the social and legal landscape of America
multiple times in dramatic ways. In the last 60 years, the U.S. Supreme Court has struck down
racial segregation in schools, protected the free press, allowed criminal defendants the right to an
attorney, removed barriers for mixed race couples to marry, confirmed the right of women to
control pregnancies, determined limits of executive privilege, decided presidential elections, and
extended marriage rights to same-sex couples. 4 These landmark cases are a small selection of
some of the more famous decisions, however, each term includes important and transformative
decisions that are made by the Court. Because the Supreme Court has discretion over their
agenda, these petitions did not have to be granted certiorari, but they were. Why? At some point
during the agenda setting process, something stood out to the justices which helped convince

In order: Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964), Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973), United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), and Obergefell v.
Hodges, 14-556 (2015).

4
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them to grant certiorari to these specific petitions over thousands of others. I argue that there has
been an overlooked variable in researching what impacts the likelihood of a petition being
granted certiorari: public attention. If the Court has an understudied lever that is used to
determine their agenda setting requirements, it stands that greater understanding of that lever
would allow a more complete view of the Court’s actions and priorities. This not only adds to the
academic understanding of American governmental systems but stands to lay the groundwork for
predictive models using new data and technologies as they are invented. Understanding new
influences and predicting the outcome of that influence with confidence helps maintain
transparency in our democracy and reinforces public trust.
This project investigates a new angle on Supreme Court agenda setting and uses a novel
measure to determine what impact public attention to specific issue areas has on the agenda
setting process. I argue and find that as public attention to an issue area increases, it can prompt
legal important players to take specific actions which ultimately affect what is on the Supreme
Court’s agenda. I argue, therefore, that there is an indirect impact of public attention on the
Court’s agenda via these outside actors.
While a relatively small, yet rich, literature addresses the cert process, understanding how
the public impacts this process is largely unexplored. There are many different aspects of an
appeal that have been shown to change the probability that the Supreme Court will grant
certiorari. The type of appeal (criminal, civil liberties/rights, taxes, etc.), how many amicus
briefs are submitted, what considerations the judges may be making, and the types of lawyers
and litigants all impact agenda setting on the Court. However, the public is conspicuously
missing from the list of known impacts on Supreme Court agenda setting. This project thus
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explores how the public can impact the agenda of an institution known for being insulated from
public opinion and contributes to the agenda-setting literature in several ways.
First, with how public attention impacts an important Court document: amicus curiae
briefs. Amici brief filing can occur during both the certiorari and merits stages, usually with
different goals in mind for the filers. When one files an amicus brief at the certiorari stage, they
are generally informing the Court of why they believe the petition should be denied or granted.
Briefs filed during the merits stage are giving the Court information about their preferred
outcome on a case and what potential ramifications may be if the Court decides one way or
another. Generally, the more amicus briefs the Court receives for a petition, the more likely they
are to grant certiorari (Caldeira and Wright 1988, 1990; Perry 1991; Baum and Neal 2009).
Further, there is evidence that the arguments found within amicus briefs end up in final Court
decisions (Spriggs and Wahlbeck 1997; Kearney and Merill 2000; Corley 2008). Thus, it is
important to understand what influences outside actors to file amicus briefs, and this project
contributes by adding public attention to the list of potential influences. The first empirical
chapter explores the connection between amicus briefs and public opinion.
This project also contributes to our understanding of what prompts powerful attorneys to
act and how the public impacts these actions. Many have explored what impact attorneys like the
U.S. Solicitor General (S.G.) have on both the agenda and final decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court. Past research has noted how dramatic the impact is when the S.G. or other government
attorneys get involved in a petition. When the S.G. petitions the Court for certiorari, or when the
S.G. informs the Court of their preference on how a case should be decided, the Court goes with
the S.G. recommendation a majority of the (Tanenhaus et al. 1963; Provine 1980; Ulmer 1984;
Caldeira and Wright 1988; McGuire 1998; Owens 2010). However, relatively few have

6

investigated why the S.G. takes action in the first place. This project explores more deeply the
motivation of the country’s most powerful attorney, along with his or her colleagues, in why they
take action. When public attention increases, the likelihood powerful attorneys will petition the
Court or write powerful documents, such as an Amicus curiae brief, also increases. This question
and ultimate findings are important because little research has explained why they choose to join
the cases they choose to join. Further, there is an assumption in the agenda-setting literature that
suggests petitions with powerful lawyers appear in front of the justices without much exploration
of why they received this attention. This contribution begins the exploration of asking why
powerful attorneys attach themselves to some cases and not others, impacting which petitions are
ultimately granted cert.
The next contribution brings both S.G. involvement and amicus briefs together with
public attention to examine how much attention the Court gives each petition before deciding its
fate. I use time spent deliberating each petition as a variable to quantify how much attention the
Court gives each petition. I find that in general, the more attention (time spent) the Court gives a
petition, the higher the likelihood they will grant certiorari. I use a two-stage model to show that
as public attention increases, both amicus briefs and government attorney involvement also
increase, which then leads to more attention paid by the justices. Thus, there is an indirect impact
of public attention on the agenda of the U.S. Supreme Court. Understanding why some petitions
receive more attention from the Court is important to more fully understand the agenda setting
process. Deeper knowledge of how this process works allows us to better predict which petitions
will be granted certiorari, and for those looking to change policy, allows for better strategies to
get a petition granted.

7

The final contribution of this research is to help bring light to a new way to measure
public engagement to specific issue areas, giving researchers insight that was once not possible.
Previous work relied on surveys or newspapers to get an idea of what might be important to the
public. Today, advancements in technology and changes in how we communicate have allowed
for new ways of measurement. Using data from what the public says online, we can get an idea
of what the public cares about at any given moment. As we watch public attention rise and fall,
we can determine how it impacts any number of political players and, for this project in
particular, how it impacts the Supreme Court. Data gathered in this manner is live, dynamic, and
constantly updating, which makes for some fascinating areas of research that can now be
explored. As the public can exert more pressure on the Court and that pressure becomes more
immediate, unfiltered, and voluminous with technology, we have an imperative to understand
how political institutions will respond. Social media potentially gives the keys to the car to that
of the public and takes away the agenda setting influences of political elites, or at least begins to
equalize the process and priority of the topics considered critical for consideration in a new way.
1.2

Theoretical Overview
The discretionary nature of the Supreme Court’s agenda opens the door to investigate

what prompts certain petitions to get attention over others. The Supreme Court is insulated from
the shifting landscape of public opinion, yet, there is considerable debate regarding how much
the Court responds to public preferences. In examining decisions at the merits stage, studies
reveal mixed findings as to how much influence the public has on the Supreme Court. Some
scholars show evidence of public opinion and elites constraining the justices’ decision making
(Mishler and Sheehan 1993; McGuire and Stimson 2004; Clark 2009; Casillas, Enns, and
Wohlfarth 2011), while others cast doubt on this proposition (Norpoth and Segal 1994; Segal and
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Spaeth 2002; Segal, Westerland, and Lindquist 2011). While a wealth of research is devoted to
what influences the Court’s decision making on the merits, there is less research regarding how
the public may influence the Court at the beginning, or the certiorari stage, of the process.
Scholars have identified many different aspects of an appeal that increase the probability
that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari. Civil liberties petitions are more likely to be granted
cert than other issues (Caldeira and Wright 1988). The number of amicus briefs holds influence
as well: petitions accompanied by more amici briefs are more likely to be granted cert. Lower
courts that are more ideologically distant from the Supreme Court are more likely to have their
cases reviewed (Tanenhaus et al. 1963; Ulmer, Hintze, and Kirklosky 1972; Caldeira and Wright
1988; Collins 2004). In addition, when certain lawyers and litigants are part of a case or submit a
brief, such as the Solicitor General (S.G.) or powerful organizations, there is a dramatic increase
in the likelihood of certiorari being granted (Nicholson and Collins 2008; Wohlfarth 2009).
Finally, studies demonstrate that salient petitions increase the likelihood of special interest
groups and government officials filing amicus curiae briefs (Solowiej and Collins 2009; Zuber,
Sommer, and Parent 2015).
However, no studies to date focus on how amici choose which petitions to join, nor
explore how public attention may influence this process. Increasing our understanding of what
factors encourage (or discourage) amici briefs is important due to their strong impact on the
certiorari process. Studies routinely find that the presence of amici briefs increases the
likelihood the Court will grant certiorari, underscoring why we need to understand what types of
petitions are most likely to secure amici (Caldeira and Wright 1988; Collins 2004).
I argue public attention indirectly influences the agenda-setting process of the unelected
court sitting at the apex of the American judiciary. However, the unelected nature of the justices
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means that this influence is a reflection of the actions taken by other actors in response to public
opinion. I argue powerful litigants, such as solicitors general, attorneys general, private repeat
players, and interest groups are similarly more likely to submit an amici brief, and more likely to
appeal their case to the U.S. Supreme Court when the case in question relates to issues of high
public salience. When public attention towards an issue area increases, several changes in
behavior occur among those surrounding the Supreme Court. More public attention applies
pressure to elected government attorneys to address the issue and interest groups wish to show
their members they are active in policy and file more amicus briefs. Public attention thus
influences powerful actors to engage a problem they may not have otherwise.
I test this theory by estimating the impact public attention has on the likelihood of amicus
briefs being filed, government attorneys petitioning the Court, interest group activity, and
influential private attorneys. The following section outlines how this dissertation will proceed,
chapter by chapter, in giving evidence to support my argument.
1.3

Chapter Outlines
Chapter 2 fully explicates my theory as to why these outside actors would care if the

public suddenly gives more attention to an issue area.
Chapter 3 then discusses my measure of public attention and how it was created; this
chapter also provides measurement validity checks. The inability to measure what is salient to
the public on an array of issues contributes to a dearth of research on how the public influences
the certiorari process, especially during debate. For the most part, existing measures of salience
capture information reflecting the state of the world after certiorari has been granted. This
project aims to bridge that gap and offers a more direct and accurate measure of what the
prevailing topics in public discourse at any given point.
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The next three chapters empirically test my theory. Chapter 4 analyzes the impact public
attention has on amicus curiae filings. I argue that when public interest in a given issue area is
high, interest groups and others seeking to capitalize on this public interest are more likely to file
amici briefs. Special interest groups desire to show their members they are actively working on
their issue of interest and filing amici briefs on related cases is a strong signal of such activity.
But what increases the likelihood of an interest group filing a brief on a particular petition? I
hypothesize that groups are more likely to take action when public attention to an issue is high,
allowing them to capitalize on this increased salience. I first confirm previous findings that
petitions receiving more amicus briefs are more likely to be granted cert. I then show that
petitions receive more amicus briefs when public attention to the relevant topic area increases.
Chapter 5 explains why and then empirically assesses how public attention impacts the
likelihood of interest groups, government attorneys, and private actors to petition the U.S.
Supreme Court or file amicus briefs. In this chapter, I argue powerful litigants, such as solicitors
general, attorneys general, private repeat players, and interest groups are similarly more likely to
submit an amicus brief and more likely to appeal their case to the U.S. Supreme Court when the
case in question relates to issues of high public salience. The results of this chapter indicate that
for government attorneys and private repeat players, an increase in public attention to an issue
area significantly increases the probability they will petition the U.S. Supreme Court for
certiorari. Further, this chapter finds that when an AG/SG is not party to a petition, they are
more likely to file an amicus brief if there is more public attention on the issue at hand. In
addition, government attorneys and interest groups are more likely to file amicus briefs before a
certiorari decision is made when public attention increases. Thus, the public has a demonstrable
impact on important actors outside of the U.S. Supreme Court. Outside actors such as interest
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groups or elected attorneys have an interest in tackling issues the public cares about, and this
chapter shows an effect of public attention.
Chapter 6 more directly tests the potential relationship between public attention, the
actions of outside groups, and the Supreme Court’s certiorari decisions. Chapters 4 and 5 reveal
that public attention significantly influences the calculations of important outside actors in the
certiorari process. I argue that the actions of these key actors in turn influence the degree of
attention the Supreme Court devotes to evaluating these petitions. Caldeira and Wright (1990)
use the docket books from Justice Brennan to examine what aspects of petitions increase the
likelihood the Court will place them on the discuss list. Variables such as U.S. being a party,
lower court conflict, issue area (Civil Liberties), ideology, and amicus curiae participation are
tested. The authors find that the U.S. Solicitor General manages to land over 90% of the cases
they are a part of placed on the discuss list, and more amicus briefs further increase the
likelihood of placement on the list. This chapter explores whether public attention to an issue
area indirectly influences how much time the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court spend
deliberating a petition.
After demonstrating the positive impact days discussed has on the likelihood of certiorari
being granted, I then model what impacts a petition to garner more attention from the Court.
Utilizing a two-stage model, I find that public attention has a positive and significant impact on
the number of amicus briefs filed in relation to a petition before certiorari, and those briefs then
positively impact the amount of attention the Court devotes to the petition. Further, the more
public attention an issue area receives, the more likely a powerful litigant is going to petition the
Supreme Court to hear a case related to the issue area, and, subsequently, the more likely the
Court will give increased scrutiny to the petition in question. The analysis in this chapter thus
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demonstrate that public attention indirectly influences which cases ultimately end up on the
Supreme Court’s docket.
Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation and gives an overview of the findings, a discussion
of broader implications, what some limitations may be, and where future research can build upon
this study. Overall the findings of this dissertation are straightforward: the public, through other
actors, has a demonstrable influence on the agenda of the U.S. Supreme Court. As past research
has demonstrated, it is important to further our understanding of what elements of a petition
increase the likelihood of certiorari being granted. However, it is also important to understand
how and why outside actors become involved on a petition, and what influences their decisions
to do so. My argument and findings show that at least some of their decision-making calculus
includes what the public pays attention to.
Further, I argue for more innovative uses of data from social media as a way to gauge
what the public is talking about, what the valence of that conversation is, and how it can be
applied in other areas of political science. In addition, this dissertation has made extensive use of
JavaScript and Python to gather large quantities of data in a relatively short amount of time, and I
argue scholars need to familiarize themselves with these tools to expand what areas are possible
to research.
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CHAPTER 2: A THEORY OF PUBLIC ATTENTION & CERTIORARI

The great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men do not turn aside in their course and
pass the judges by.
-Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo 1921, 168
2.1

Introduction
The Supreme Court is, in many ways, structurally insulated from the shifting landscape

of public opinion, yet there is considerable debate regarding how much the Court responds to
public preferences. In examining decisions at the merits stage, there are mixed results on how
much influence the public has on the Supreme Court. The court on one hand appears to follow
along with what the general public mood or opinion is on a given issue (Mishler and Sheehan
1993; McGuire and Stimson 2004; Clark 2009; Casillas, Enns, and Wohlfarth 2011), and on the
other hand, the Court seems to be immune from public opinion (Norpoth and Segal 1994; Segal
and Spaeth 2002; Segal, Westerland, and Lindquist 2011). Much research has been dedicated to
deciphering what influences the Court’s decision making on the merits, however, less is known
regarding how the public may influence the Court at the certiorari stage.
When the public is particularly attentive to an issue area, the complexion of petitions to
the U.S. Supreme Court may change. Interest groups eager to please their members seize on
public interest to file amici briefs and government officials take a policy stand. While the Court
is mostly insulated from public backlash, a multitude of constraints and pressures do exist. For
its decisions to be carried out, often the other branches need to be involved. If the public
disapproves of the Court, the incentive for the executive and Congress to carry out its decisions
might wane. The public, then, may have more of an impact on the Court than currently
understood.
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Knowing more about how the agenda is set at the Supreme Court furthers our
understanding of how this institution operates and why some petitions and policies are decided
over the others. The policy-making power of this institution makes understanding how and why
public opinion matters in the agenda-setting process important.
This project asks whether the public indirectly influences the Supreme Court’s agendasetting behavior. I posit public interest in an issue may spur other actors known to influence the
Court into action. When there is high public interest in an issue, powerful litigants such as the
Solicitor General or state Attorneys General may be encouraged to write a brief arguing for the
Court to accept a petition dealing with the issue. In addition, interest groups seeking to capitalize
on public interest and demonstrate their actions to their members may be more likely to file
amici briefs. As such actions – such as the SG being a party to a case or interest groups filing
amicus briefs – increase the likelihood of the Court granting cert, public attention on an issue
area may exert an indirect impact on the petitions the Supreme Court agrees to hear.
What I do not argue is for any direct connection between public attention and certiorari
decisions. Instead, I argue past research has overlooked the impact the public has on those actors
we know are influential in the Court’s agenda setting process. Certain attorneys and interest
groups have an outsized influence on the Court’s certiorari decisions. I argue those interest
groups and attorneys are influenced by public attention and they, in turn, sway the Court’s
agenda via the actions they take.
This chapter summarizes my theory and begins by outlining the current literature on the
decision to grant or deny certiorari. I then explicate my theory of the indirect influence public
attention has on the Court’s certiorari process through its influence on certain key actors in the
legal process. I further discuss my specific expectations for how public attention influences the
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actions of interest groups and governmental actors, and the effect of their actions on which
petitions the Court devotes the most attention.
2.2

Writs of Certiorari
In the judicial branch, litigants can appeal a lower court’s decision to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court, however, chooses which cases it will hear; this power is known as
discretionary jurisdiction. Losing parties may therefore file a petition for writ of certiorari
requesting that the Court review their case. These petitions are then reviewed by the Supreme
Court, and a small fraction are granted a Writ of Certiorari. Roughly 7,000 to 8,000 petitions are
filed each term seeking attention from the Court, and about 1% are granted review. 5 When a
petition is granted certiorari, it means that the Court has agreed to hear the case in full and
formally added it to its agenda. Thus, a crucial question arises with how the Court determines
which few petitions it will accord a full hearing.
Rule 10 of the Supreme Court provides some guidance as to the types of cases the Court
favors for granting a writ of certiorari; these include cases with legal conflicts between lower
courts, or cases where the lower court “has decided an important federal question in a way that
conflicts with relevant decisions of the Supreme Court.” 6 A primary motivation of the Court thus
is to maintain a uniform body of law throughout the country. However, conflicts among lower
courts is not the only metric the justices use when deciding to grant certiorari. Not every case
appealed to the Supreme Court has equal merit, and many are often found frivolous. Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Brennan have commented that many of the petitions are “patently

Caldeira, Gregory A., and John R. Wright. 1990. "The discuss list: Agenda building in the Supreme Court." Law
and Society Review: 807-836.
6
Rules of the Supreme Court no. 10: Considerations Governing Review on Certiorari
5
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without merit” and do not require discussion; it is the Court’s job to only devote time to cases of
real need (McKay 1979; Perry 1991; O’Brien 2008).
A key part of weeding out cases depends on certain aspects of the petition itself. Early
work on this topic put forward cue theory, which argues that elements of some petitions stand
out from others and the justices then take these cues under consideration during the certiorari
review process. Cue theory suggests that justices pay attention to the reputation of the attorneys,
the reputation of the lower court judge or circuit, case type (e.g. civil liberties/rights versus tax
law), and the parties to the case (e.g. federal government) (Tanenhaus et al. 1963; Ulmer, Hintze,
and Kirklosky 1972). More recently, scholars have noted that ideology also matters: for instance,
a conservative Supreme Court is more likely to accept cases from a liberal circuit than one from
a conservative circuit, and vice versa (Caldeira and Wright 1988; O’Brien 2008).
Strategic and interpersonal calculations also play a role in the certiorari process. A
justice may be hesitant to grant certiorari if he/she feels the Court as a whole would not back
his/her preferred policy in ruling on the merits of a case—known as a “defensive denial” of
certiorari. When a petition comes up for review, a strategic justice who wants to move a policy
closer to his/her preferred position will be more likely to grant certiorari if he/she feels there will
be a majority of justices that support that position (Perry 1991; Boucher and Segal 1995; Segal
1997; Caldeira, Wright, and Zorn 1999).
Scholars have identified many different aspects of an appeal that change the probability
of the Supreme Court granting certiorari. The type of appeal matters; civil liberties’ petitions
will generally fare better at getting certiorari granted than other issues, more amici briefs
increase the likelihood of certiorari, as does the ideological distance between the Supreme Court
and the lower courts (Tanenhaus et al. 1963; Ulmer, Hintze, and Kirklosky 1972; Caldeira and
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Wright 1988; Collins 2004). In addition, certain lawyers and litigants being part of a case or
submitting a brief, such as the Solicitor General (S.G.) or powerful organizations, also increase
the likelihood of certiorari being granted (Nicholson and Collins 2008; Wohlfarth 2009).
I argue that some of the impetus of outside actors attempting to influence the Supreme
Court is partially dependent on how much attention that issue has recently received from the
public. Interest groups want to show their engagement in a policy, and I argue they are more
likely to file an amicus brief when an issue, in their purview, has sufficient attention from the
public. Elected officials in both the state and the federal government have a keen interest in
tackling issues their constituents are concerned about, which I posit increases their likelihood of
formally joining a petition or filing an amicus brief. Also, agents of elected officials, including
the S.G. and state Attorney Generals are motivated to act when an issue becomes salient to the
public. This response from key actors then encourages the Court to grant certiorari to petitions in
the salient issue areas. Thus, the public indirectly influences the Supreme Court by placing
incentives and pressure on outside actors.
2.3

Amicus curiae
Amicus curiae briefs also provide strong cues for the Supreme Court. Amici briefs are

filed by individuals or entities who are not formally a part of the case. 7 Amici briefs can be
submitted both at the certiorari or the merits stage. 8 These briefs can serve as a cue for justices
with regards to what people ideologically similar/distant believe, if other institutions prefer one
outcome or cert to be/not be granted, and/or if the legal community has an opinion on certiorari.

Rules of the Supreme Court no. 37: Brief for an Amicus curiae
After a petition has been granted, new amici briefs are submitted to persuade the justices to rule one way or
another
7
8
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Amici briefs are effective, particularly at the certiorari stage. Generally, as the number of
amicus briefs increase (either for or against the petitioner), there is a higher likelihood that the
Supreme Court will hear the case (Caldeira and Wright 1988, 1990; Perry 1991; Baum and Neal
2009). In fact, nearly all cases accepted by the Supreme Court have amici briefs filed (Epstein
and Knight 1999; Kearney and Merrill 2000). There has been an increase in the number of
amicus briefs being filed over time, particularly from special interests and large organizations
(Epstein and Knight 1998; Collins 2004). Interestingly, the legal arguments contained within the
briefs filed at the merits stage of the process often make their way into the final opinion as well,
indicating that they are informative to the justices and can have an impact on the eventual
precedent set (Spriggs and Wahlbeck 1997; Kearney and Merrill 2000; Corley 2008). In
addition, this effect is similar for amicus briefs filed in the circuit courts of appeal (Martinek
2006).
While expensive, many interest groups find filing an amicus brief to be money well
spent. Members of special interest organizations want their organizations to influence a policy
change, and these briefs are tangible evidence of such attempts (Solowiej and Collins 2009).
Amicus briefs signal to the members of an interest group that the organization is acting and
attempting to influence a policy (Wasby 1995; Collins and Martinek 2010; Zuber, Sommer, and
Parent 2015). Using amicus briefs as a vehicle, interest groups can inform the justices of the
harm or benefits of granting certiorari (at the cert stage) or what repercussions may occur at the
merits, or decision stage (Collins 2004, 2008).
Some argue that amici participation itself is a proxy for public attention or public salience
on a given case. With no direct way to capture salience on a specific case or issue area, scholars
argue that increased amici participation signals more public or legal interest. And, studies find
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that the Court pays more attention to certiorari petitions with high levels of amici participation
(Hansford and Damore 2000; Maltzman and Wahlbeck 1996; Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck
2000; Collins 2004). Thus, attention paid by the public suggests a connection between public
salience and an increase in the likelihood of granted to salient petitions. However, scholars have
not yet explored what induces outside amici to join these particular petitions. Put another way,
why do some petitions become salient?
I argue that because special interest groups and elected members of government
(including state governments) have an interest in affecting policy, an increase in public attention
to an issue area may induce these groups / government bodies to file more amici briefs for
showing their involvement. Thus, increased attention from the public is likely to produce more
amicus briefs related to a salient issue area, which in turn makes it more likely that the Supreme
Court will accept petitions related to that issue. Most scholars examine which cases receive
amicus briefs, as opposed to why the amici were filed in the first place. Understanding why
amicus briefs are filed in the first place, however, is necessary to fully understand what impact
they have later.
In the 2014 – 2015 Supreme Court term, there were a record number of amicus briefs
filed during both the cert and merits stages; 9 a record-breaking 147 amici were filed for one
case—the gay marriage case—Obergefell v. Hodges, an extremely salient issue area. 10 In other
recent terms, 136 amici were filed in the cases surrounding the Obamacare decision, 156 split
between two other gay marriage cases Perry 11 and Windsor 12, and 47 filed for the recent Texas

The National Law Journal, August 19, 2015.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. (2015)
11
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. (2013)
12
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. (2013)
9

10
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abortion case, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt. 13 These cases are easy to identify as ones
in which there was intense public interest even before the Court granted certiorari, which I argue
is a component as to why there were so many amicus briefs filed.
Interest groups are the major players in issuing these briefs as it helps to show their
members that they are actively attempting to change policy (Wasby 1995; Hansford 2004;
Collins 2004, 2008; Solowiej and Collins 2009; Collins and Martinek 2010; Zuber, Sommer, and
Parent 2015). I argue the more salient the issue area, the more likely it is that interest groups,
lobbying firms, and others will file an amicus brief on a case addressing that issue in order to
satiate their members. Thus, increased public salience indirectly influences the Court by inducing
more amici briefs on salient issue petitions versus non-salient ones, which in turn raises the
likelihood of these (salient issue) petitions being granted cert.
2.4

Lawyers and Litigants
Certain actors have an outsized influence on the Court, and their motivation for acting

may be influenced by public attention to specific issue areas. The Solicitor General may be the
most important outside actor. The strength of the S.G. is quite evident; for instance, when the
S.G. submits an amicus brief or recommends the Court hear a case, the Court is much more
likely to accept that case for review (Tanenhaus et al. 1963; Provine 1980; Ulmer 1984; Caldeira
and Wright 1988; McGuire 1998; Owens 2010). Once the Solicitor General has made the
government’s position clear, the Court sides with the government, majority of the times. When
the Court and executive branch are ideologically aligned, the S.G. wins 87% of the time, whereas
that number is still as high as 60% if the President and Court are not ideologically aligned
(Bailey, Kamoie, and Maltzman 2005; Wolfarth 2009). The president and S.G. may see high
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Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. (2016)
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public attention surrounding an issue area which encourages action by the executive branch.
Action could include filing an amicus brief stating their position to affect the policy and appease
their supporters. The S.G. will not always be told explicitly by the executive to file a brief in a
case, but in general, her actions can be viewed as a proxy for what the executive branch prefers
(Johnson 2003; Nicholson and Collins 2008; Owens 2010).
This deference to the executive via the S.G. suggests the justices are strategic and do not
simply execute their own policy desires, but also consider other actors. When a case is politically
salient, the ideology of the individual justices wins out over arguments or positions of other
branches of the government (McAtee and McGuire 2007). On the merits, non-salient cases
appear to leave the justices open to persuasion from other branches or amici briefs, whereas
salient cases rouse the justices, inducing a more ideological behavior (McAtee and McGuire
2007; Black and Owens 2012; Fix 2014). An exact reasoning as to why this is the case is not
clear, however, some have speculated that the Justices feel the need to be more ideological in
their decision-making when the issue is salient to the public (Segal and Spaeth 2002).
Scholars argue that the S.G. will be more likely to file a brief or become more active in
litigation if the case/issue is important to the public (Puro 1971; Salokar 1992). In recent work,
Nicholson and Collins (2008) seek to identify when the S.G., arguably the most powerful actor
outside of the justices themselves (Caldeira and Wright 1988; Pacelle 2003; Bailey, Kamoie, and
Maltzman 2005), would be prompted to file an amicus curiae brief. The authors find that when
certain legal, political, or administrative conditions are present, the S.G. is more likely to do so.
Specifically, they find that when cases are salient, as measured via the NYT salience measure,
the S.G. is 15% more likely to file a brief (Nicholson and Collins 2008). Thus, if an issue is
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important to the public, it is more likely that the S.G. will become involved, thus increasing the
likelihood of certiorari being granted
While no other individual lawyer is in front of the Court as often as the S.G., research
shows that other high powered, connected, or elite lawyers can also affect the Supreme Court’s
agenda-setting (McGuire and Caldeira 1993). Litigants with more financial resources are more
likely to have their petition granted by the Court and receive a favorable decision on the merits
(Galanter 1974; Songer, Sheehan, and Haire 1999). For instance, this “hierarchy of litigants,”
where some litigants perform at higher rates, illustrates that government entities win more often
than businesses, which win more often than interest groups, who win and get their cases granted
certiorari more so than individuals (Owen 1971; Galanter 1974; Wanner 1975). Across all
federal courts, government entities are four times more likely than individuals, and twice as
likely than businesses, to have their cases heard and won (Songer and Sheehan 1992). Further,
among the individual litigants, those who are well financed and employ lawyers who are repeat
players in front of the Supreme Court are the most likely to have their petitions granted (Feldman
and Kappner 2016). In all, those with the most resources are able to direct the agenda and have a
strong influence on the eventual outcomes of the Court’s decisions.
Research also suggests that litigants themselves are strategic. The decision to appeal a
judgment comes down primarily to economics; litigants must determine if their perceived payoff
will be greater than the costs incurred by mounting an appeal to a higher court (Priest and Klein
1984; Kessler, Meites, and Miller 1996). A part of the calculation for litigants is the ideological
makeup of the court the case will be appealed to. There is ample evidence of ideologically
strategic litigants. For instance, when deciding to appeal a case, litigants take the ideological
temperature of the higher court and use that to determine their eventual success (Zorn 2002;
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Baird 2007; Yates and Coggins 2009; Giles, Walker, and Zorn 2006; Black and Owens 2009;
Mak, Sidman, and Sommer 2013). I argue that litigants take notice when an issue becomes
salient to the public and alter their planning. If the public is generally on their side, they will
push forward and file a petition. Further, other actors besides parties on the petition take notice,
adding another layer of the public’s influence.
In addition to the S.G., an under-explored area of research is if the state Attorneys
General or other elite lawyers will seek out or attach themselves to a case in an issue area that is
salient among the public. For A.G.s and executive branches of state, getting involved with cases
that the wider public is concerned with makes intuitive sense. State executive branches and
A.G.s have policy goals, and litigation is the means of pursuing those goals. The State Attorneys
General will likely not be compelled to issue a brief or join a case that is nationally salient,
unless it is also salient within their state as they too are motivated by policy and electoral goals.
Major law firms or elite lawyers who sense an increase in salience for an issue area, or the public
opening a window, may more likely represent petitions relating to that issue if it aligns with their
clients or lobbying goals. The culmination of these various actors’ changing behavior due to
public salience can indirectly impact how the Court sets their agenda. In short, if an issue is
highly salient to the public in a handful of states, it is likely the A.G.s of those states will join
cases or file briefs related to those issue areas, which in turn will increase the likelihood of
certiorari being granted.
Finally, interest group behavior in the Courts is worth attention due to the large role they
play in American politics. Generally, interest groups influence representatives with campaign
contributions or by mobilizing their large base of support in the public (Bentley 1908). Interest
groups need to push for specific policy goals to show supporters they are active in the issues’
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arena and maintain membership (Walker 1983; Collins 2004; Cigler, Loomis, and Nownes
2015). Walker (1983) examines the creation and continued maintenance of interest groups in the
20th century. Walker finds that interest groups who accomplish their goal with no new agenda
tend to disappear, and those who maintain strong allegiances with the public, especially in terms
of monetary donations, thrive. While most interest groups in Walker’s period of study were
founded by a wealthy patron, without continued public support, the interest group loses clout in
achieving policy goals.
2.5

Discuss List
Before the writs of certiorari are decided, some petitions—a short list of petitions the

Justices feel are worth the extra attention—are placed on the Discuss List. The Court eventually
creates its agenda from the discuss list for the upcoming term, with approximately 7% to 9% of
petitions making it to the list. The factors currently known to impact the likelihood of petitions
being placed on the discuss list include amicus briefs, S.G. involvement, and the ideological
distance between the lower court and the Supreme Court (Caldeira and Wright 1990). However, I
argue that there exists another influence on the discuss list—public attention to the petition’s
issue area. Others have argued similarly, essentially that the justices and clerks are all a part of
the society and likely know if an issue is particularly salient when they are reviewing petitions
(Giles, Blackstone, and Vining 2008; Baum 2009; Fix 2014).
Understanding which factors influence the decision of placing a petition on the discuss
list and granting of certiorari is important because of the clear link between the agenda-setting
function of the Court and their ultimate decisions. Thus, when controlling for other known
influences on the discuss list, I argue that high public salience to an issue will exert its own effect
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via the actions of outside actors. These outside actors take notice of the public’s attention and file
amicus briefs or petitions to the Court in situations they might not have otherwise.
In the Judiciary, there are two ways in which the Court can give attention to an issue; the
discuss list and granting of certiorari. Litigants need to persuade the Court to give their petition
attention, and the first hurdle they need to overcome is making it to the discuss list. The discuss
list has origins in the mid-1900s after the Supreme Court was given discretionary jurisdiction
with the Judiciary Act of 1925. Immediately following the Judiciary Act, the justices created a
“dead list”, or cases not to be discussed. Later, the dead list was dropped in favor of a “discuss”
list. Justice Stevens describes it: “In the 1975 Term, when I joined the Court, I found that other
procedural changes had occurred. The 'dead list' had been replaced by a 'discuss list'; now the
chief justice circulates a list of cases he deems worthy of discussion and each of the other
members of the Court may add cases to it" (Stevens 1983, 13). Stevens (1983) argues the change
from dead list to discuss list was meaningful, as it changed how attention was given to each
petition. Originally, every petition was debated unless it was placed on the dead list, and now no
petition is discussed unless it is placed on the discuss list. Rarely do the justices browse the full
list of petitions; clerks who make up the certiorari pool largely analyze the petitions first.
Caldeira and Wright (1990) examine what aspects of petitions increase the likelihood that
the Court will place them on the discuss list. Variables such as the U.S. being a party, lower
court conflicts, issue areas (Civil Liberties), ideological distance, and amicus curiae participation
were tested. Some aspects have a strong impact on the likelihood of making it to the discuss list:
If all of the qualities except the United States as a petitioner, amicus briefs, and real
conflict are present in a case, it [petition] has a .39 probability of making the discuss list.
The addition of an amicus curiae brief increases the probability of discussion to .74.
Similarly, on the decision on a writ of certiorari absent the United States as a petitioner,
an amicus brief, and actual conflict, the addition of an amicus brief more than doubles its
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chances. The message seems clear: organized interests as amici curiae perform an
especially central role in both stages of the decision. (Caldeira and Wright 1990, 831).
In addition, the authors find that the S.G. gets over 90% of the cases they are a part of
placed on the discuss list, and more amicus briefs further increase the likelihood of placement on
the list.
The Court needs legitimacy from the public to operate and cannot enforce decisions
alone, meaning opinions of other government institutions and the public are likely considered
(Caldeira 1986; Caldeira and Gibson 1992; Gibson and Caldeira 1998; Ignagni and Meernik
1994; Bailey, Kamoie, and Maltzman 2005; Hettinger and Zorn 2005; Curry, Pacelle, and
Marshall 2008; Hall 2014; Gibson and Nelson 2015). While the Court does have a reliance on
other institutions, generally, their decisions are carried out and executed faithfully (Curry 2007;
Chutkow 2008; Carrubba and Zorn 2010). Indeed, some argue that compliance from other
government institutions is due to the high amounts of support and legitimacy for the Court, given
by the public.
I argue and explore more in depth in chapter 6 about public attention being another yetto-be-tested impact on the discuss list. I posit that when an issue is highly salient among the
public, the Court will spend more time deliberating petitions related to the salient issue area. This
is not due to the Justices wishing to appease the public or out of fear of retribution from other
branches, but because the outside actors change their behavior (i.e. file more briefs / convince the
Court it is worth the time) which influences the Justices to do so.
Either due to concerns about maintaining their legitimacy, replacing the justices, or
wanting to tackle issues the public cares about, the Court generally tracks public opinion at the
merits stage. Some argue that the Court’s mechanism of following public opinion at the merits
stage is due to the replacement of justices over time (Norpoth and Segal 1994; Giles, Blackstone
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and Vining 2008) or due to constraints perceived from other elected branches (Chutkow 2008;
Harvey and Friedman 2009). The public elects the President who selects future justices, as well
as the senators who confirm them. Thus, the installation of a new justice would then be reflective
of public opinion at that time. Others argue that public opinion produces a real constraint on
judicial decision making at the merits stage, regardless of the changes in composition of the
justices (Mishler and Sheehan 1993; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995; Hurwitz, Mishler,
and Sheehan 2004; McGuire and Stimson 2004; Casillas, Enns and Wohlfarth 2011).
I present a detailed argument in Chapter 6 about if the Court decides cases with an eye to
public opinion at the merits stage, the justices may also do so during the certiorari process. The
justices and their clerks are a part of the society and it is a reasonable assumption they are aware
of the issues that are salient to the public at any given time (Caldeira and Wright 1990; Giles,
Blackstone, and Vining 2008; Baum 2009; Fix 2014). Chapter 6 specifically examines how
public attention influences the amount of time the Court spends on each petition.
2.6

Conclusion
Scholars have shown that the Court is responsive to external actors in its decision making

in several ways. First, the Court generally tracks public opinion at the merits stage, regardless of
the changes in the composition of the justices (Mishler and Sheehan 1993; Stimson, MacKuen,
and Erikson 1995; McGuire and Stimson 2004; Casillas, Enns and Wohlfarth 2011). Second, the
Court defers to the executive branch at both the merits and certiorari stages when their attorneys
take part in the case. For example, once the S.G. has made the government’s position clear, the
Court sides with the government most of the times (Bailey, Kamoie, and Maltzman 2005;
Wolfarth 2009), and when the S.G. submits an amicus brief recommending the Court to hear a
case, the Court is much more likely to do so (Caldeira and Wright 1988; Provine 1980;
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Tanenhaus et al. 1963; Ulmer 1984; Owens 2010). Third, at the certiorari stage, the Court takes
notice when a petition garners a high amount of amicus curiae briefs. Generally, as the number
of amicus briefs increase (either for or against the petitioner), there is a higher likelihood that the
Supreme Court will hear the case (Caldeira and Wright 1988; Perry 1991; Baum and Neal 2009).
In addition, legal arguments contained within briefs filed at the merits stage of the process often
make their way into the final opinion as well, indicating that they are informative to the justices
and have an impact on the eventual precedent set (Spriggs and Wahlbeck 1997; Kearney and
Merrill 2000; Corley 2008).
This project builds on previous research and argues that public interest in an issue area
can have an indirect effect on the likelihood of petitions being placed on the discuss list, and
ultimately being granted certiorari. I argue that when an issue becomes highly salient to the
public, formal actors such as the S.G. and interest groups are likely to increase their participation
in petitions dealing with these salient issue areas. The justices and clerks notice the actions taken
by these key legal actors and alter the discuss list accordingly, thus indirectly increasing the
likelihood of the Court granting certiorari to petitions dealing with that salient issue area.
In the next chapter I introduce my measure of public attention. I show how it was
constructed and compare its results with another measure used to determine what is important to
Americans on a national level: Gallup’s Most Important Problem survey.
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3
3.1

CHAPTER 3: MEASURING PUBLIC ATTENTION

Introduction
When scholars wish to empirically examine a phenomenon, they often create their own

data or try and incorporate a measure created by others into their work. In George Bohrnstedt’s
(2010) presentation of measurement in social sciences, he comments on a trend where our
measures are not capturing what we wish them to capture. He argues there are clear and fuzzy
measures in social science. Clear measures include age, marital status, race, income, etc.,
whereas concepts such as attitudes or beliefs often require assumptions to wedge them into our
empirical models and theories. Bohrnstedt argues that when measures which do not accurately
capture what the researcher is looking to examine are used, theories are bent to accommodate
measures, watering down both theories and findings. In response to this presentation, discussants
noted that this trend “also leads to the development of ‘habitual measurement practices,’ that is,
relying on the same measures regardless of whether they truly represent the theoretical constructs
of interest” (National Research Council 2011, p. 16). Creating measures for specific questions is
important, and for this project, a new measure is required. I am concerned with finding out how
much the public is talking about an issue.
Since 2006 a paradigm shift has occurred in how people share information and
communicate with each other. The public now, more than ever, has multiple platforms to openly
discuss topics it finds interesting or outraging. The use of social media has become pervasive,
with surveys reliably suggesting that 80% of American adults are online, and a large majority
engage with at least one social media platform per day. 14 Social media companies such as
Dr. Nicole Ellison and Dr. Cliff Lampe. Social Media Update 2016. Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C.
(November 11th, 2016). http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/11/11/social-media-update-2016
Maeve Duggan. Social Media Update 2015. Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C. (August 19th, 2015).
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/08/19/mobile-messaging-and-social-media-2015
14
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Twitter and Facebook exploded in popularity in 2008 through 2010, with both platforms growing
at over 1,000% a year (Golbeck, Grimes, and Rogers 2010). Adoption of social media is
particularly strong among younger Americans, with 90% of 18-24-year old’s using multiple
platforms daily. Among all adult Americans, a stunning 69% regularly communicate on at least
one social media platform, with about half using Twitter. 15 Participation in social media
generally crosses racial, socioeconomic, gender, and community lines. Minorities use social
media at the same rates as whites, as do women and men, those in rural or urban areas, as well as
those at various levels of income. 16 These online interactions and conversations are tracked and
archived, leaving open the possibility to gauge what topics and issues are given the most
attention by the public at any given moment.
Others have used data from social media to help answer an array of important questions
such as how social media influences political participation (Gibson, Lusoli, and Ward 2005;
Gainous and Wagner 2011; Bond et al. 2012; Boulianne 2015), how news coverage is affected
by social media (Wallsten 2011), and how social media is impacting polarization (Howard et al.
2011; Gainous and Wagner 2013). This project is not the first to use data from social media,
however, to my knowledge it is the first to use counts of social media activity to capture attention
to an issue area.
This chapter proceeds with a brief background on other salience measures widely used in
public law, followed by an explanation of how I collected the data for my public attention
measure. After explaining the measurement collection process, I validate the measure against one

Duggan et al. Social Media Update 2015. Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C. (January 9th, 2014).
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/01/09/social-media-update-2014
15
Aaron Smith and Monica Anderson. Social Media Update 2018. Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C.
(March 1st, 2018)
16
Social Media Fact Sheet. February 5th, 2018. Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C.
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/social-media/
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I feel is trying to get at a similar concept: the Gallup Most Important Problem survey. I
demonstrate that while my measure and the Gallup measure are similar, they also have important
distinctions that separates the two. I conclude with a summary of findings and introduce chapter
4, the first empirical chapter.
3.2

Argument for a new Public Attention Measure
There are two types of salience as measured in the public law literature: political salience

and legal salience (Cook 1993). For an issue to be legally salient it must be “important” insofar
as how it affects the law, the people who work with and are close to the law (Maltzman, Spriggs,
and Wahlbeck 2000). Political salience by contrast can be described as an issue being highly
important to the public or politicians but not necessarily to those of the legal community (Epstein
and Segal 2000). Issues such as abortion, gay rights, guns, etc., are typically classified as
politically salient cases. A case can be legally salient, politically salient, both, or neither.
The most widespread measure of salience within public law is the Epstein and Segal
(2000) New York Times salience measure (NYT). To capture which issues are politically salient,
the NYT measure reviews the front page of The New York Times the day after the Supreme Court
decides a case. If the case appears on the front page the day following the decision, it is marked
as salient; if not, it is marked as not salient. Others have taken this method and expanded the
number of newspapers to produce a more comprehensive assessment of salience (Collins and
Cooper 2011; Clark, Lax, and Rice 2015). Within the states, scholars have used the same
approach as Epstein and Segal, but instead of using major national papers, they use the largest
newspaper in each state by circulation and again look for state supreme court cases on their front
pages (Vining and Wilhelm 2009).
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To gather data on legal and political salience outside of newspapers, scholars have
created an array of other measures. Some use annual polling data such as the Gallup Most
Important Problem Survey to gauge what issue is most on top of mind for the public (Fix 2014).
There have also been attempts to capture legal salience, arguing that measuring how much the
justices speak during oral arguments can be a proxy for how important that issue is for each
justice (Black, Sorenson, and Johnson 2013). Other examples include using case citations in
constitutional law textbooks as a proxy for salience (Slotnick 1978), or the number of amicus
curiae briefs submitted (Maltzman and Wahlbeck 1996).
While useful, nearly all existing measures are captured after the case or certiorari has
been decided or are part of a survey of pre-determined responses, lacking an unfiltered view of
what the public is talking about. A more useful measure of salience, particularly when studying
the influence of the public, would observe opinion while petitions are being debated. Unlike
previous measures of salience, my social media measure overcomes concerns about capturing
information ex post facto, or at a single instance in time. Rather, this measure provides dynamic,
contemporaneous information about what issues the public cares about.
The pervasiveness of social media, along with sophisticated tracking data, enables
researchers with the ability to identify what issues are being discussed, how often, and is superior
for this type of analysis over traditional methods. Harnessing data available from what is
expressed online can help scholars identify what exactly the public is talking about at any given
moment. The public’s opinion on what is important may change depending on current events.
Data from social media is live, constantly updating, and includes the entire universe of people
using social media. Due to social media’s pervasiveness, the data derived is a true window into
what the public is talking about.

33

3.3

Creating the Measure
Due to access limitations, I selected three issue areas on which to collect data regarding

how much the public talked about an issue between 2010 and 2017. The three issues selected
were abortion, campaign finance, and anti-trust. I selected these issues for a few reasons. First, I
wanted issues that are distinct from one another with no concerns that my capturing of public
conversation would be seen as grabbing the same conversation twice. Second, I wanted to vary
the levels of salience. Abortion is routinely listed as one of American’s top concerns, 17 while
campaign finance’s salience waxes and wanes; anti-trust is a more technical issue that generally
garners little public attention. Finally, I wanted to make sure to collect information on issues that
are regularly appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
To collect data regarding how much attention the public has paid to the selected three
issues over time, I used a service named Sifter. Sifter has a special research relationship with
Twitter, and their data company, GNIP, which allows Sifter to request Twitter activity data.
After the search parameters are set, GNIP/Sifter takes a sample of all Tweets within the time
selected and gives an estimate of Twitter activity. These samples from GNIP/Sifter are highly
accurate; GNIP/Sifter will use these estimates to charge customers seeking more data on the
tweets in question. In this case, I set parameters for every month from January 2010 through
December 2017 for each of the three topic areas, resulting in a count of Twitter activity by month
by issue area. Due to Twitter’s relatively small public adoption in their earlier years, I use the
years 2010 through 2017. 18 As an example, to determine how much attention campaign finance
was receiving in September 2013, the following search process was utilized:

Public Opinion on Abortion. Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C. (10/15/2018).
http://www.pewforum.org/fact-sheet/public-opinion-on-abortion
18
Number of monthly active Twitter users worldwide https://www.statista.com/statistics/282087/number-ofmonthly-active-twitter-users/
17
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•

•
•

Boolean search for Campaign Finance would read as follows: ("Citizens United v. FEC"
OR "Citizens United" OR "Campaign Finance" OR "Campaign Finance reform" OR
"Dark money" OR "Money in politics" OR pac OR pacs OR "Super PAC" OR "Super
PACs") 19,20
An example date would be specified (e.g., 09/01/2013 through 09/30/2013)
United States would be set as the geographic area
For example, the above scenario for September 2013 registered 431,000 mentions of

Campaign Finance on Twitter. September 2015 registered 476,000 mentions. I repeat this
process for every month and every topic area between January 2010 and December 2017.
Because Twitter’s popularity increased over time, I normalize my measure of the number
of mentions of a topic area per month based on average Twitter usage during that time period. In
September 2010, there were approximately 14 million Twitter users. In September 2017, that
number increased to 69 million. Thus, 500,000 tweets in 2010 is a larger percent of Twitter
activity than it is in 2017. To ensure my measure of public attention can be compared over time,
I divide the total number of mentions by topic area/month by the total number of Twitter users
during each quarter. (Twitter does not report user base statistics by month – only by quarter.)
This procedure provides a standardized measure of public attention for these three topic areas
from 2010-2017. Therefore, it serves as a reliable gauge of public attention that is comparable
over the years. Public attention is thus the average of Twitter activity for that petition’s topic
area over the previous twelve months.
3.4

Validating and Exploring the Measure
There are no other direct comparisons to validate this new measure; however, past

research utilizes methods that are roughly approximate to the data I collected for this project.

Boolean search refers to a type of search allowing users to combine keywords with operators such as AND, NOT
and OR to further produce more relevant results.
20
Boolean search phrases used are available in Appendix C of the dissertation. Key words were chosen based on
words most often used in conjunction with the primary issue area of interest.
19
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One relevant measure of what is important to Americans is data from Gallup’s Most Important
Problem survey. Gallup’s survey asks Americans to select what issues are the most important
problem. Researchers affiliated with the Policy Agendas Project (PAP) have recoded Gallup’s
data according to the PAP content coding by “major topic” to create the Recoded MIP Data Set
(Heffington, Park, and Williams 2017). The MIP Data Set contains annual information
regarding what respondents deemed the most important problem in the United States from 1947
to 2018. By using this data as a means of comparison, I will show correlations between survey
responses and data collected via social media.
I need to be clear that this is not a 1:1 comparison. The data I collected relates to very
specific issue areas (abortion, campaign finance, and anti-trust), whereas the MIP Data Set and
Gallup’s survey lump together issues into broader categories. For example, abortion is coded as
“civil rights,” and campaign finance falls into the broad category of “government operations.”
While this is not an exact validation, I believe the topic areas and my issue areas are relatable
enough for meaningful comparison. Further, I focus specifically on the campaign finance and
abortion issue areas as anti-trust does not show dramatic fluctuation in either my public attention
variable or the MIP data set. As a reminder, anti-trust was specifically selected because of its
generally low conversation rates.
3.4.1

Public Attention to Abortion, Campaign Finance, and Anti-trust
In Chapter 1, I reviewed the story surrounding Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom

Club PAC v. Bennett. 21 In this case, the Supreme Court sided with the petitioners to strike down
a 1998 Arizona law that gave candidates for statewide office funds depending on how much
money their opponents spent. I argued in the introduction that the relatively intense attention this

21

Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721 (2011)
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petition received in the form of powerful lawyers and amicus briefs was partly due to the
increase in public attention campaign finance received during this period in time. Figure 3.1
illustrates the level of public attention to campaign finance from 2010 through 2017. This data is
derived from Twitter and illustrates fluctuations in how much Americans discussed the issue
over time.

Figure 3.1: Public Attention to Campaign Finance – Twitter

Figure 3.2: Most Important Problem - Government
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Figure 3.1 shows in the first and second quarter of 2010, just before the filing of the
Arizona petition, public attention toward campaign finance reached a near all-time high. If one
searches for news articles for any of these issue areas along with the date of each spike, it is
generally easy to see what event rallied public interest. Public attention toward campaign finance
lowers considerably in later 2010 but reaches its highest levels of public salience in 2012, during
the presidential campaign. In 2012, the term “Super PACs” entered the American lexicon, and
that same year, John Edwards was on trial for campaign finance violations. The issue falls off
most American’s radar until Bernie Sanders enters the 2016 presidential race, and the issue has
remained salient, with some volatile spikes ever since.
When compared to the Gallup/MIP survey data regarding what issue is the most
important, there are similar peaks and valleys. The data from Twitter reports by quarter per year
along the X axis, whereas the MIP data reports annually. Figure 3.2 illustrates the same time
period, but for the corresponding “major topic” that the Comparative Agendas Project places
campaign finance within. The data from these two different-but-similar sources/issue areas both
show an increasing slope in early 2010, spiking in 2012 followed by a dip, and then an everincreasing curve since the 2016 election. Again, I realize this is not an apples-to-apples
comparison but given campaign finance is often a major concern of government operations, I
believe it is a feasible means to compare measures.
Abortion is the next issue area I compare to the Gallup/PAP MIP data. Abortion is an
issue area that never fades from public discourse and is simultaneously salient and not at top of
mind. Polling finds that nearly all adult Americans, 95%, have some opinion on abortion and
how the government should legislate on the issue. 22 Thus, I expect abortion to be the most talked
Public Opinion on Abortion. Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C. (10/15/2018).
http://www.pewforum.org/fact-sheet/public-opinion-on-abortion
22
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about issue among the three topics I selected. Figure 3.3 and 3.4 show how attention has shifted
toward abortion/civil rights over the same time 2010-2017 period.

Figure 3.3: Public Attention to Abortion – Twitter

Figure 3.4: Most Important Problem – Civil Rights
The data from both sources, while not measuring the exact same issue area (MIP would
also include gay rights, freedom of speech, etc.) have a remarkably similar distribution. Figure
3.3 shows a relatively low amount of public attention to abortion that remains stable until the
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final quarter of 2016. The MIP data in 3.4 also shows a steep increase of Americans responding
that civil rights are the most important problem over the same period. The end of 2016 coincided
with the election of Donald Trump, and in January 2017 he signed an executive order banning
federal money to groups that perform or provide information on abortions. Afterwards there have
been other developments in this topic area, keeping the issue highly discussed among Americans.
While looking at these two topic areas independently shows a clear comparison between
the MIP and Twitter data, I believe there is value in laying these figures on top of one another in
order to get an idea of how much more or less each topic is discussed when compared to each
other. Figure 3.5 combines all three topics’ Twitter data to illustrate how much Americans are
talking about abortion versus campaign finance and anti-trust. Figure 3.6 does the same but uses
MIP data.

Figure 3.5: Public Attention to Abortion, Anti-trust, and Campaign Finance - Twitter
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Figure 3.6: Most Important Problem - Civil Rights and Government
When all issue areas are compared, it is apparent in figure 3.5 that after Citizens United
was decided, the public paid much more attention to campaign finance than the other two topics.
Interestingly in 3.6 the same trend does not occur. Both figures show an increase in respondents
identifying the issue as the most important problem or talking more about the issue on Twitter at
roughly the same time. However, there is a meaningful difference between the two measures that
I believe is a strength for using social media. The data gathered from Twitter is capturing what
people are saying online as they are talking about it versus the data from Gallup’s MIP survey is
a survey from a moment in time with pre-determined options. Thus, while respondents may want
to tell a survey that they are most concerned with civil rights or another issue, they are talking
more about campaign finance, at least in 2010 through 2012. Using data from Gallup over the
years of 2010 – 2016 might suggest an over representation of Americans being concerned with
civil rights when they are talking and tweeting about different issue areas. The respondents may
believe civil rights are a more important issue, however, when interest groups, corporations,
elected officials, and the news media see what is trending online, they will see what the public is
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talking about instead of what they respond to on a survey. Again, the goal of this measure is to
quantify how much Americans are talking about specific issues over time, and I believe it
reliably does that.
Returning to figure 3.5, it is worth noting that while anti-trust does not reach public
conversation levels near the other two topic areas, there is fluctuation within the topic itself.
Further, as empirically shown in subsequent chapters, these relatively minor fluctuations in the
public attention given to anti-trust (as well as the other two) causes meaningful responses by
outside actors in litigation.
3.5

Conclusion
This chapter began with a discussion about how measures need to be made and used for

precise questions in order to help inform precise theories. I then discussed how many Americans
now use social media to communicate with one another and voice their opinions. After reviewing
other measures used, I discussed how the Gallup/Policy Agendas Project MIP Data set is
somewhat comparable to the data I gathered from Twitter. There are similarities between the
two, but also important differences. The MIP data is a survey at a moment in time, giving
respondents a selection of issues to select. Gathering data from Twitter provides a more direct
and truthful representation of what the public is talking about at any given moment. Further, data
gathered from social media can be exact versus falling into large and general “major topic” areas
such as civil liberties. One can explicitly look at what and how much Americans are saying about
an issue if we utilize the data available to us instead of relying on surveys or newspapers.
Data regarding what the public is talking about on social media is the clearest way to
capture public attention to an issue. Due to social media’s pervasiveness, use, and widespread
adoption in the United States. I argue that this pervasiveness means that conversations online are
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not a sample of the public’s conversation, but the actual, entire conversation. Thus, capturing
what the public is talking about online is capturing what the public is talking about on the whole.
Once fully realized, this measure has the possibility of furthering our ability to understand how
the public may influence elite agenda-setting and decision-making writ large. This measure
provides an important opportunity to create a dynamic measure of public attention/opinion that
may aid us in moving beyond some of the issues surrounding traditional methods of collecting
public opinion, such as surveys, or other methods of gathering this information.
In this chapter I compared my measure of public attention to the MIP survey data from
the Policy Agendas Project. Generally, my measure tracks with what respondents believe to be
the most important problem over the same time period. Distinctively, however, the measure
derived from social media is more precise in topic versus the wide categories used by the PAP.
Further, my measure shows that while respondents on a survey may list one thing as the most
important issue, they are talking about something else in their day to day interactions. Thus, this
measure is a valid and important way to gauge what the public is talking about at any given point
and is superior to other measures attempting to capture a similar metric.
Chapter 4 begins the empirical analysis of this project and asks how public attention
impacts the likelihood of special interests, government attorneys, and others to file amicus curiae
briefs before a petition has been granted/denied certiorari. I employ the measure discussed here
to find that as public attention toward an issue area increases, so too does the likelihood of these
impactful documents being filed.
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4
4.1

CHAPTER 4: PUBLIC ATTENTION AND AMICUS BRIEFS

Introduction
Amicus curiae briefs are documents submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court that argue

either in favor or opposition to the Court granting certiorari to a particular case, or in favor of a
particular legal outcome if the case is accepted for a full hearing. These documents are influential
and, in general, are intended to let the Court know what the governmental entity, interest group,
or concerned citizen who files the brief thinks about the merit or implications of the petition.
Recent terms have seen a dramatic increase in the number of amicus briefs filed. In
January 27, 2017, President Donald Trump signed an executive order which for 90 days barred
entry of foreign nationals from specific countries as a security risk. The executive order was
commonly known as the “travel ban,” and it incited nationwide protest, received wide coverage
on news media, and generated heated debate on social media; the ban was also immediately
challenged in federal district court. On March 29, 2017, the United States District Court for the
District of Hawaii granted an injunction to stop the Trump administration from enacting the
travel ban from specific countries. On appeal the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
court and blocked implementation of the ban on May 15th, 2017. On June 1st, 2017, the Trump
administration filed a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging these decisions. During the four
months between filing of the petition and the Court making a certiorari decision, the case
received a staggering 88 amicus briefs – the most of any petition from 2010 through 2017 by a
wide margin.
In reviewing other salient petitions, such as abortion and gay marriage, a clear link
emerges between those related to issues with high amounts of public attention receiving the
majority of amicus briefs before a certiorari decision. In the 2014-2015 Supreme Court term,
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there were 147amicus briefs 23 filed during both the certiorari (beginning) and merits (end) stage
in Obergefell v. Hodges. 24 One hundred and thirty-six amici were filed in the cases surrounding
the Obamacare decision, 156 split between two other gay marriage cases Hollingsworth v.
Perry 25 and United States v. Windsor, 26 and 47 were filed in the Texas abortion case Whole
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt. 27 These issues generated high amounts of public attention, and in
turn received a record-breaking number of amicus briefs. While the Court is purposely designed
to be insulated from public opinion, there may be other, more nuanced ways the public is helping
set the agenda at the highest court in the land.
4.2

Insulated but Still Impacted
The Supreme Court is highly insulated from the shifting landscape of public opinion due

to its position at the apex of the federal judiciary and the justices’ life tenure. However, there is
also considerable debate regarding how much the Court responds to public preferences.
Examinations of decisions on the merits produce mixed results. Some scholars show evidence of
mass and elite opinions constraining the justices’ decision making (Mishler and Sheehan 1993;
McGuire and Stimson 2004; Clark 2009; Casillas, Enns, and Wohlfarth 2011), while others cast
doubt on public opinion as a causal mechanism (Norpoth and Segal 1994; Segal and Spaeth
2002; Segal, Westerland, and Lindquist 2011). While a wealth of research is devoted to what
influences the Court’s decision making on the merits, there is relatively little research regarding
how the public may influence the Court at the certiorari stage of the process.

The National Law Journal, August 19, 2015.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. (2015)
25
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. (2013)
26
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. (2013)
27
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. (2016)
23
24
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This chapter investigates whether the public indirectly influences Supreme Court
certiorari decisions through amicus curiae briefs. Prior research demonstrates that salient
petitions increase the likelihood of special interest groups and government officials filing amicus
curiae briefs (Solowiej and Collins 2009; Zuber, Sommer, and Parent 2015). However, no other
studies connect public interest, salience, or attention to amici filings. Increasing our
understanding of what factors encourage (or discourage) amici briefs is important due to their
strong impact on the certiorari process. Studies routinely find that the presence of amici briefs
increases the likelihood the Court will grant certiorari, underscoring why we need to understand
what types of petitions are most likely to secure amici (Caldeira and Wright 1988; Collins 2004).
I argue that when public interest in a given issue area is high, interest groups and others seeking
to capitalize on public interest are more likely to file amici briefs.
4.3

Certiorari and the Supreme Court
As mentioned earlier in the dissertation, there are many different aspects of an appeal that

increase the probability that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari. Some issues such as civil
liberties are more likely to be granted than others, and the number of amicus briefs filed along
with solicitor general participation generally increases a petitions chances (Tanenhaus et al.
1963; Ulmer, Hintze, and Kirklosky 1972; Caldeira and Wright 1988; Collins 2004; Nicholson
and Collins 2008; Wohlfarth 2009).
While a small yet rich literature addresses the cert process, understanding how the public
impacts this process is largely unexplored. As detailed in Chapter 2, when the public is
particularly attentive to an issue area, the entire complexion of litigation may change due to
actions of outside actors. Interest groups eager to please their members may seize on such cases
and file amici briefs or hire powerful attorneys to litigate these issues. Government officials may
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take a policy stand, directing their attorneys (i.e. the Solicitor General) to litigate a publicly
salient issue. Elected attorneys general in the states may also feel that it is important to act on an
issue when the public is paying more attention to it. Thus, I argue that outside actors keep the
public in mind, and when the public is paying more attention to an issue area, these outside
actors are more likely to file amici briefs, influencing the Court.
4.4

Amicus curiae
Amicus curiae briefs provide strong cues for the Supreme Court. Amici briefs are filed by

individuals or entities who are not formally a party to the case. 28 Amici briefs can be submitted
both at the certiorari or merits stage. 29 These briefs can serve as a cue for justices to understand
what people ideologically similar/distant believe, if other institutions prefer one outcome or cert
to be/not be granted, and/or if the legal community has an opinion on certiorari.
Amici briefs are effective, particularly at the certiorari stage. Generally, as the number of
amicus briefs increase (either for or against the petitioner), there is a higher likelihood that the
Supreme Court will hear the case (Caldeira and Wright 1988, 1990; Perry 1991; Baum and Neal
2009). In fact, nearly all cases accepted by the Supreme Court have amici briefs filed (Epstein
and Knight 1999; Kearney and Merrill 2000). While the total number of amicus per term is flat
from 2010 through 2017, 30 on larger time periods there has been an increase in the number of
amicus briefs filed over time from special interests and large organizations (Epstein and Knight
1998; Collins 2004). Interestingly, the legal arguments contained within briefs filed at the merits
stage of the process often make their way into the final opinion as well, indicating that they are
informative to the justices and can have an impact on the eventual precedent set (Spriggs and
Rules of the Supreme Court no. 37: Brief for an Amicus curiae
After a petition has been granted, new amici briefs are submitted to persuade the justices to rule one way or
another.
30
Appendix Figure A.1 illustrates the number of amicus curiae from 2010 through 2017.
28
29
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Wahlbeck 1997; Kearney and Merill 2000; Corley 2008). In addition, this effect is similar for
amicus briefs filed in the circuit courts of appeal (Martinek 2006).
While expensive, many interest groups find filing an amicus brief to be money well
spent. Members of special interest organizations want their organizations to influence policy
change, and these briefs are tangible evidence of such attempts (Solowiej and Collins 2009).
Interest groups use the creation of an important document such as an amicus brief as a
demonstration to its membership of attempting to influence policy (Wasby 1995; Collins and
Martinek 2010; Zuber, Sommer, and Parent 2015).
Some argue that amici participation can be a proxy for public attention or public salience
on a given case. With no direct way to capture salience on a specific case or issue area, scholars
argue that increased amici participation signals more public or legal interest. Studies find that the
Court pays more attention to certiorari petitions with high levels of amici participation
(Hansford and Damore 2000; Maltzman and Wahlbeck 1996; Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck
2000; Collins 2004). Thus, attention paid by the public suggests a connection between public
salience and an increase in the likelihood of granting certiorari to salient petitions.
Most scholars examine which cases receive amicus briefs, as opposed to why
organizations file amici in the first place. Cases receiving amici briefs are then used as an ex post
facto proxy for public salience. However, why are amici attracted to particular cases as opposed
to others? My argument is that interested parties are more likely to file a brief on a case related to
a specific issue area if it is salient to their relative constituencies. Interest groups and elected
members of government (including state governments) have an interest in appealing to their
constituencies and/or members, along with influencing policy. I argue that an increase in public
attention to an issue area may induce these groups/government bodies to file more amici briefs to
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show they are involved, performing the job their supporters expect of them. Thus, increased
attention from the public is likely to produce more amicus briefs related to a salient issue area,
which in turn leads the Supreme Court to be more likely to accept petitions related to that issue.
Interest groups are major players in issuing these briefs as it helps show their members
they are actively attempting to change policy (Wasby 1995; Hansford 2004; Collins 2004, 2008;
Solowiej and Collins 2009; Collins and Martinek 2010; Zuber, Sommer, and Parent 2015). I
argue the more salient the issue area, the more likely interest groups, lobbying firms, and others
will be to file an amicus brief on a case addressing that issue in order to satiate their members. I
further argue, and test in Chapter 6, that these actions by key legal actors in turn raise the
likelihood of these (salient issue) petitions being granted cert.
4.5

Data and Methods
To examine the effect of public attention on the likelihood of amici brief filings to the

U.S. Supreme Court, I gathered every paid petition filed between years 2010 to 2017. In forma
paperatis (IFP) petitions were not collected because most IFP petitions are criminal appeals
which have much less flexibility in their ability to be overturned and are much less likely to be
granted certiorari (Feldman and Kappner 2016). I used a web text-scraping code to gather all
paid petitions to the U.S. Supreme Court from 2010 through 2017. 31 This scraping procedure
netted 12,016 paid petitions over the eight terms.
After gathering the petitions filed during my time of interest, I identified all cases that fall
into my three topic areas of interest: abortion, anti-trust, or campaign finance. The resulting sub-

Web scrapers are code that can automatically collect data from websites. In this case, a web scraper would input a
petition number, collect the data, and move on to the next petition number for each year of interest.
31
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data-set includes 160 petitions related to either abortion, anti-trust, or campaign finance from
2010 through 2017. 32
4.5.1

Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in this analysis is the total number of amici briefs filed for each

petition before a certiorari decision. The resulting variable is a count, ranging from zero to 14.
Because the dependent variable is a count of amicus briefs, I use a negative binomial regression.
Additional reasoning for a negative binomial estimation and a comparison between alternative
model specifications are located in Appendix B.1. My expectation is that as public attention
increases for a given topic area, there will be more Amici Before Cert filed for petitions related to
that issue area.
4.5.2

Independent Variables
My primary independent variable of interest is Public Attention. As explained in detail in

Chapter 3, this variable reflects a standardized measure of the average monthly number of
mentions of a topic area in the previous twelve months. Again, due to Twitter’s relatively small
public adoption in their earlier years, I examine the years 2010 through 2017. 33
I also account for whether the U.S. is a party to the case. The Solicitor General is an
important player in the cert process, and if he or she is involved, the likelihood of certiorari
being granted increases dramatically (Nicholson and Collins 2008; Wohlfarth 2009). The S.G. is
successful because she thoughtfully picks which cases to present to the Court, while also
representing an important legal player – the executive branch. Thus, if the S.G. argues for the
U.S. Supreme Court to hear a case – and does so in specifically selected cases – then the Court is

While the number of cases in the data-set is not large, it is sufficient for my analysis.
Number of monthly active Twitter users worldwide https://www.statista.com/statistics/282087/number-ofmonthly-active-twitter-users/
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likely to heed that call as a sign that it is a case that needs to be decided. Given the importance of
the Solicitor General and the federal government, I created a dichotomous variable to account for
if the federal government is party to the case.
Further, ideological distance between the U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts is a welldocumented cue for the Supreme Court and also a factor in how litigators decide which cases to
appeal. When a lower court is ideologically distant from the U.S. Supreme Court, it is more
likely that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari in order to “correct” a lower court’s decision
(Scott 2006; Owens and Simon 2011; Grant, Hendrickson, and Lynch 2012). Given this
information, it is important to control for ideological distance as outside actors may understand
this relationship and write more or less amicus briefs because of it.
To estimate the ideological distance between the Supreme Court and the lower circuits, I
rely on the Judicial Common Space measure from Epstein et al. 2007. The Judicial Common
Space (J.C.S.) measure estimates the median ideological score for the Supreme Court and all 11
circuits plus D.C. I take the absolute value of the difference between Supreme Court and lower
each court medians per term. This absolute value increases as the distance between the courts
grows. For example, in 2011 the median J.C.S. score for the 9th circuit was -0.2585 and the U.S.
Supreme Court’s median was 0.2107. 34 The resulting difference is a value of 0.4692. A majority
of petitions to the Supreme Court are from the Circuit courts. Of the 12,016 petitions, 8,142 are
from a circuit court whereas 3,874 are not. Petitions originating from courts where ideology
scores are not available (many states and individual district courts) are excluded from the models
including this Ideological Distance variable.

Judicial Common Space scores are coded as such that a positive number indicates a more conservative median
whereas a negative value indicates a more liberal median.
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4.6

Results
An overview of the dependent variable for the first model is displayed in Table 3.1. Over

half of all petitions related to my three topic areas of interest received zero amicus briefs before a
decision on certiorari was made. Generally, if a petition receives an amicus brief, it will receive
one to four, with petitions receiving more than four being exceedingly rare.
Table 4.1: Amicus curiae Before Cert
Number of Amici
Frequency
Percent
0
6,938
85.21
1
582
7.15
2
264
3.24
3
132
1.62
4
89
1.09
5
46
0.56
6
30
0.37
7
21
0.26
8
12
0.15
9
8
0.1
10
6
0.07
11
3
0.04
12
2
0.02
13
2
0.02
14
3
0.04
15
1
0.01
18
1
0.01
78
1
0.01
88
1
0.01
Total
8,142
100.00

Cumulative
85.21
92.36
95.6
97.22
98.32
98.88
99.25
99.51
99.66
99.75
99.83
99.86
99.89
99.91
99.95
99.96
99.98
99.99
100

Before testing the primary hypothesis of this chapter, I first confirm past findings
regarding the importance of amici briefs in the certiorari process. For this model I use all
petitions filed from 2010 through 2017 that appealed a case from a federal circuit court (8,142). I
created a dichotomous variable indicating if certiorari was granted (1) or denied (0). I then
include the Amici Before Cert variable, along with an indicator of if a solicitor general (state or
federal) was party to the case, Ideological Distance, and a variable denoting how many days
were taken to arrive at a decision. Table 3.2 displays the estimates of this logit model.
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The results show that amici briefs filed before a cert decision have a positive and
statistically significant impact on the likelihood of cert being granted for the petition. Further,
state or federal solicitors general being party to the petition also increase the likelihood of
certiorari being granted, supporting previous findings. Additionally, the more days the Court
spends discussing a petition has a positive and significant impact on Certiorari. This impact of
discussion-time is more thoroughly explored in Chapter 6. Finally, contrary to previous research,
the Ideological Distance between lower circuit courts and the Supreme Court does not have a
statistically significant influence, although the coefficient is positively signed.
Table 4.2: Certiorari Outcome and Amicus Briefs
Granted Certiorari p-value
Amici Before Cert
0.348
0.000
(0.025)
Ideological Distance
0.49
0.114
(0.31)
S.G. Party to Case
0.24
0.038
(0.116)
Discussion in days
0.007
0.000
(0.0005)
Constant
-3.414
0.000
(0.117)
Observations

8,142

Standard errors in parentheses – Logistic Regression

Using a logit model allows us to estimate significance and directionality of our variables;
however, it does not allow for an easy understanding of the substantive impact of variables. To
illustrate the impact of amici briefs on the likelihood of certiorari being granted, I generate a
predictive margins plot for the various amounts of amicus briefs filed before certiorari. I hold
the other variables at their median (Ideological distance, Discussion in Days) or mode (S.G.
Party to Case). Figure 4.1 illustrates these findings.
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Figure 4.1: Probability of Certiorari being Granted – Amicus Briefs
Before generating predictive margins, I removed some of the extreme outliers. Given
99.9% of all petitions have 16 or less amicus briefs filed before certiorari, I cap the analysis at
16. 35 With the other variables held at their modal or median values, there is a 4.4% likelihood of
a petition being granted certiorari when there are zero amicus briefs filed. The presence of three
amici briefs almost doubles the likelihood of certiorari being granted to 8.5%. At the maximum
number of amicus briefs filed in this subset, 16, the probability of certiorari being granted
increases to 92.37%. The model predicts that when nine amicus briefs are filed a petition reaches
51% probability of being granted. When examining the entire data-set with no limits to amicus
participation, once a petition receives more than 16 amicus briefs it is virtually guaranteed to be
granted certiorari.

Predictive margins were ran using the entire data-set, however, once a petition receives more than 16 amici briefs
the probability of certiorari being granted increases to near 100%. Further, capping at 16 allows for a more focused
view at what the majority of petitions receive versus illustrating the outliers.
35
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These results confirm previous studies and demonstrate that cert petitions receiving more
amicus curiae briefs are most likely to be granted certiorari. These findings also reveal why
studying what impacts amici brief submission is a worthwhile endeavor: If public attention
increases the likelihood of amicus briefs being filed, it suggests there is an indirect influence of
the public on the certiorari process.
I now test my main theoretical contention: increased public attention to an issue area will
increase the number of amici briefs petitions related to that issue receive. The dependent variable
for this analysis is a count of how many amici briefs each petition received; I use a negative
binomial regression to estimate the models. Since I only have public attention data on three topic
areas, the number of petitions for this analysis drops to 160. I control for the Ideological
Distance between the lower court and USSCT, and whether the S.G. is a party to the case. Table
4.3 reports the results for this model.
The results of the negative binomial estimate show a positive and statistically significant
relationship between public attention and the number of amicus briefs filed before a cert
decision. Thus, as public attention to an issue area increases, the likelihood of an amicus brief
being filed on a case in that issue area also increases. This result suggests that key legal actors
are responding to cues sent by the public about what issues deserve attention. The only other
variable to reach statistical significance is if the S.G. is party to the case. This result builds on
previous work and suggests that when the S.G. is a petitioner, others take notice and file amici
stating their desired outcome. Interestingly, again, the Ideological Distance between the U.S.
Supreme Court and lower courts is not statistically significant.
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Table 4.3: Determinants of Amicus curiae before Certiorari
Amici Before Cert
p-value
Public Attention
62.37
0.048
(31.49)
Ideological Distance
0.0626
0.950
(1.007)
S.G. Party to Case
0.584
0.075
(0.328)
Constant
-0.158
0.661
(0.361)
Observations

160

Standard errors in parentheses – Negative Binomial Regression

To assess the substantive impact of public attention, I create a predicted number of events
margins plot. The two other independent variables are held at their medians. At the lowest
amount of public attention, the predicted number of amici briefs is less than 1. At the mean of
public attention, the predicted number of amici briefs increases to 1.21. At the maximum amount
of public attention, the predicted number of amicus briefs increases to 2.37. Figure 4.2 illustrates
the spectrum of results from minimum to maximum public attention. Connecting back to the
earlier findings in Figure 4.1, there is a substantively significant impact of public attention on
amicus briefs being filed. The margins in Figure 4.1 illustrated that when a petition received
roughly three amicus briefs, there was a ten percent increase in the likelihood of certiorari being
granted over a petition with no amicus briefs. The earlier analysis in figure 4.1 suggested nine
petitions as the so-called magic number of amicus needed for a petition to be more than 50%
likely to be granted. While the maximum number of amicus filed with maximum public attention
is close to four in this estimation, four can have a strong impact on if a petition will be granted
cert. Using a larger data-set of issue areas, or different issue areas, might reveal more strength of
public attention.
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Figure 4.2: Predicted Events – Number of Amici Briefs & Public Attention
4.7

Conclusion
This chapter builds on previous research and finds that public interest in an issue area can

have indirect effects on the likelihood of petitions granted certiorari via amicus curiae. I find
that when an issue becomes highly salient to the public, interested parties will be more likely to
file amicus curiae briefs. I further mirror earlier studies that show petitions receiving more
amicus briefs are more likely to be granted certiorari. Thus, this relationship between the public
and other interested parties may indirectly increase the likelihood the Court will grant certiorari
to petitions dealing with that salient issue area.
This chapter examined what impact public attention has on the filing of amici briefs in
general. Chapter 5 explores what motivates specific key actors, particularly government
attorneys and interest groups, to petition a case to the Supreme Court and file amicus curiae
briefs.
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5

CHAPTER 5: IMPACT OF PUBLIC ATTENTION ON INFLUENTIAL
ATTORNEYS AND INTEREST GROUPS

5.1

Introduction
Certain attorneys and interest groups who are well known in legal circles have been

shown time and again to have an outsized impact on all levels of courts. These repeat players are
more likely to have their petitions granted certiorari, and they are more likely to win their cases
before the Supreme Court (Galanter 1974; Feldman and Kappner 2016). These powerful groups
are motivated to act for several reasons. I argue that one key motivation for both public and
private repeat players is the amount of attention the public pays to a specific issue.
On October 9th, 2015, California enacted the Reproductive Freedom, Accountability,
Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (the “Act”). A key element of the Act required all
licensed pregnancy clinics within California to disclose information to patients about available
family planning services offered by the state and private providers, including abortion and
contraceptive options. The Act was set to begin enforcement on January 1st, 2016. On October
13th, 2015, the National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (NIFLA) and two other
religiously affiliated groups who provided pregnancy services sued, attempting to block
implementation of the new law. The plaintiffs argued that the requirement of the law to force all
licensed pregnancy assistance entities, including religious ones, to disclose information regarding
abortion and contraceptives violated their free speech and free exercise rights.
In February 2016, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California denied
the plaintiffs request for an injunction, finding they were unable to show a likelihood of success
on their free speech or free exercise claims as required by previous precedent. Further, the Court
found the Act is a neutral law of general applicability which survived rational basis review. In
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short, the Court sided against the plaintiffs. On October 14th, 2016, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals unanimously affirmed the District Court’s decision. On March 20th, 2017, NIFLA and
the other religious groups filed a petition for a writ of certiorari at the U.S. Supreme Court to
overturn the earlier decisions. Within one month of filing the petition, seven interest groups
submitted amicus curiae. It is relatively rare for a petition to receive an amicus brief at all and
receiving seven briefs before a cert decision places it in the 96th percentile of all petitions who
have received a at least one brief.
The Supreme Court deliberated the petition for 160 days and ultimately granted
certiorari. The Supreme Court received many amicus briefs, the lower court was ideologically
distant, and state A.G.s became involved – all known cues the Court is known to look for. Once
the decision to grant cert was made, the petition received 46 additional amicus curiae from an
array of outside actors including members of congress, state A.G.s, other interest groups, and
concerned citizens. In a 5-4 decision the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, finding
that the California Act violated religious pregnancy centers First Amendment rights. 36 Outside
participation in this case was vibrant, and I argue it can partially be explained by public attention.
Reviewing the data regarding public attention over this period reveals that abortion as a
topic reached its highest amounts of public discussion in 2016 and 2017. Figure below illustrates
the amount of public attention abortion received from 2010 through 2017. Beginning in the final
months of 2016 the public began discussing abortion at much higher rates, with a peak occurring
in the first quarter of 2017.

36

Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, (June 26, 2018)
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Figure 5.1: Public Attention to Abortion
Public attention to this issue was high, and I argue outside actors were aware of the
public discussion. A majority of amicus briefs filed in Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v.
Becerra (2018) discussed above were from other pro-life interest groups or states (Texas) who
supported the petitioners. Participation from outside groups was generally high during this period
in petitions relating to abortion, with not all petitions being granted cert even with many markers
that generally predict a petition will be accepted.
Another abortion related petition during the same time period out of Arkansas. In 2017,
Arkansas enacted four laws which aimed to make getting an abortion more difficult, outlawing
certain abortion techniques, and restricting certain age groups from seeking an abortion. 37 Not
long after passage of these anti-abortion laws, legal challenges arose. In Planned Parenthood v.
Jegley (2018), a medical doctor alleged the new restrictions were not constitutional and won a
stay in the federal district court. The state appealed to the Eighth Circuit, and attorneys general

37

Arkansas 2017 house bills 1032, 1434, 2024, and 1566.
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from 15 (largely liberal) states and Washington, D.C., filed a joint amicus brief in support of the
physician challenging the new Arkansas abortion laws. 38 In the amicus brief, the attorneys
general argued the new Arkansas laws unconstitutionally created an undue burden to terminate a
pregnancy, increased health risks, and increased cost. On appeal, the Circuit reversed and
remanded the lower court’s decision, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Much like the case discussed earlier out of California, public attention was high, and
outside actors likely saw a notable increase in public attention during litigation. 39 Interest groups
supported the physician challenging the law, and a strong contingent of 15 state attorneys general
became involved. The states represented in the amicus brief include New York, California,
Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and the District of Columbia; liberal states in
which attorneys general are incentivized to pursue litigation that appeals to their constituents.
Further, once the appeal reached the Supreme Court, there were two amicus briefs filed before a
certiorari decision. 40 While certiorari was ultimately not granted, it is important to review
petitions such as this. Many state attorneys and outside groups took notice and attempted to
change policy through this litigation. While ultimately unsuccessful, the public may have helped
spur extra participation that otherwise may not have occurred.
Some Attorneys General advertise their legal pursuits, much like Attorney General Eric
T. Schneiderman of New York. In a statement on the Attorney General’s website, Schneiderman
listed a full-throated defense of why he is directing his office to spend valuable time fighting
Brief Amicus curiae from the Attorneys General of New York, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii,
Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and the
District of Columbia.
https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press_releases/States%20Amicus%20Brief%20STAMPED.pdf
39
From June 2016 (when Arkansas and other states enacted tougher abortion laws) through June 2017, the amount
of public attention paid to the abortion issue area more than doubled.
40
https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/17-935.html
38

61

against the Arkansas legislation, along with many other challenges to women’s reproductive
rights across the country. Schneiderman argues in a press release, “[W]e’re seeing a proliferation
of laws that seek to eliminate safe, medically-accepted accepted methods of abortion. We will
not stand by while women’s health and constitutional rights are jeopardized by extremist laws.” 41
Many government attorneys make public statements such as these, likely to ingratiate themselves
with their constituencies.
In the previous chapter, I argue heightened public attention to certain issue areas
increases the likelihood of amicus curiae briefs being filed alongside petitions related to these
salient issues. In this chapter, I argue powerful litigants, such as solicitors general, attorneys
general, private repeat players, and interest groups are similarly more likely to submit an amici
brief, and more likely to appeal their case to the U.S. Supreme Court, when the case in question
relates to issues of high public salience. Public attention and outcry can influence powerful
actors to engage a problem they may not have otherwise. This chapter proceeds as follows: I first
explicate why these repeat players are likely to be influenced by heightened public attention to
an issue, and why they may respond to this public interest by joining a petition for certiorari on
related cases. I also distinguish between the motivations of government attorneys as opposed to
private repeat players. I then outline how I test this theory of elite attorney action and report the
results of my empirical tests.
5.2

Federal Attorneys
The Solicitor General (S.G.) may be the most important outside actor that appears in front

of the U.S. Supreme Court. The strength of the S.G. is clearly established: when the S.G.
A.G. Schneiderman Leads Amicus Brief Defending Women's Access To Constitutionally-Protected Abortion
Services
https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-leads-amicus-brief-defending-womens-access-constitutionallyprotected
41
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petitions the Court for certiorari, the Court is much more likely to accept that case for review
(Tanenhaus et al. 1963; Provine 1980; Ulmer 1984; Caldeira and Wright 1988; McGuire 1998;
Owens 2010). Once the Solicitor General has made the government’s position clear, the Court
sides with the government most of the time at the merits stage (McGuire 1998; Owens 2010).
The influence of the S.G. crosses ideological boundaries: When the two branches are
ideologically aligned, the S.G. wins 87% of the time on the merits, and that number is still as
high as 60% even when they are not ideologically close (Bailey, Kamoie, and Maltzman 2005;
Wohlfarth 2009). Given that the U.S. Supreme Court accepts less than 1% of all petitions it
reviews, the impact of the S.G. getting her petitions granted and decided (most of the time) in her
favor cannot be over stated.
The S.G. can generally be viewed as a proxy for the president and executive branch’s
preferences (Johnson 2003; Nicholson and Collins 2008; Owens 2010; Rogol 2018). Due to the
president’s electoral and policy goals, the executive branch and S.G. are obviously aware when
an issue becomes highly important to the public. The S.G. may be encouraged to file a brief for
political reasons stating the position of the executive branch (Supreme Court Rule 37.4). The
S.G. is more likely to file a brief or become more active in litigation if the case/issue is important
to the public (Puro 1971; Salokar 1992). Nicholson and Collins (2008) investigate what legal,
political, and administrative conditions may prompt the S.G. to file an amicus curiae brief.
Central to this discussion, they find that when cases are salient, as measured via the New York
Times salience measure (Epstein and Segal 2000), the S.G. is 15% more likely to file a brief
(Nicholson and Collins 2008). However, this salience measure, as discussed in Chapter 3,
captures a post hoc determination of case salience. Their findings do not therefore distinguish
between whether the case was salient at the time the S.G. decided to file the brief, or,

63

alternatively, whether the S.G. filing the brief contributed to its increased salience at the time the
decision was handed down. Thus, I similarly hypothesize that the S.G. is more likely to submit
an amicus brief or join a petition when the issue garners more attention from the public, and
these actions have an outsized impact in increasing the likelihood of certiorari being granted for
that petition. I expand on their analysis, however, by exploring whether public attention to an
issue at the time the S.G. is deciding whether to get involved influences the S.G.’s decision
making. Previous work has demonstrated the impact of the S.G. on Supreme Court agenda
setting and decision making. My expansion further fills in what prompts the S.G. to take action
on certain cases.
5.3

State Attorneys
Like other elected officials in the states, State Attorneys General or Solicitors General

also have a keen interest in litigating cases the public cares about and is paying attention to
(Brace et al. 2002; Erikson, Wright, and Mclver 1993; Jacoby and Schneider 2001; Provost
2010). For example, on the “role of the Solicitor General” page of the Florida S.G.’s website,
one key part of the responsibilities of the job include pursuing “matter[s] of great public
interest.” 42 And, beyond the general belief in supporting the public interest, state A.G.s are also
influenced by personal electoral concerns: In 43 of the fifty states, state Attorneys General are
elected, giving an electoral incentive to attending to issues of public import. Catering to public
opinion within their states is a high priority for state A.G.s as the position has often been used as
a stepping stone for higher elected positions, including governor and U.S. Senator (Clayton
1994; Mahtesian 1996; Provost 2003). Provost (2010, 4) argues “state AGs are driven by

Homepage of the Florida Attorney General:
http://myfloridalegal.com/pages.nsf/main/a0cb91c5c403a0f385256cc6007a3808!opendocument
42
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normative concerns of what policies are best for the state, but also by pragmatic concerns such as
reelection and, for the more ambitious, reaching higher offices, such as governor.” In short, the
leap from A.G. to Governor or Senator would not be possible if the public did not approve of the
A.G.’s record. State attorneys general thus have a clear incentive to pursue cases the public cares
about.
Other research provides additional evidence suggesting that state A.G.s pay close
attention to issues the public cares about. Spill, Licari, and Ray (2001) find that in states with
higher amounts of smoking related disease and a relatively small tobacco farming industry, state
A.G.s were more likely to file tobacco litigation early and often. If the state was a major
producer of tobacco, however, state A.G.s took their time in joining this litigation, if they joined
at all. Thus, I hypothesize that as public attention to issue areas increases, the likelihood of
powerful state attorneys filing certiorari petitions, as well as amicus briefs, related to those
salient issue areas also increases. To my knowledge, no one has expressly studied the link
between state A.G. behavior, petitions for certiorari, and amici briefs to the U.S. Supreme Court.
This dissertation explores that link and demonstrates that increased public attention prompts state
actors to become more involved in cases, both in terms of bringing cases and filing amici briefs,
to show the public they are taking action.
5.4

Private Attorneys & Interest Groups
While no other individual lawyer is in front of the Court as often as the S.G., other high

powered, elite lawyers can also influence Supreme Court agenda setting (McGuire & Caldeira
1993). Litigants with more financial resources are more likely to have their petitions granted by
the Court and are more likely to receive a favorable decision on the merits (Galanter 1974;
Songer, Sheehan, and Haire 1999). These extra resources allow for litigants to hire counsel who
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are influential on their own. These elite attorneys include former U.S. Solicitors General, state
A.G.s, or other repeat players who are often in front of high courts. For example, elite private
attorneys such as David Boies and Theodore Olson, former executive branch lawyers, have no
shortage of clients who wish to retain them. Boies and Olson were on opposite sides during the
Bush v. Gore case, and in 2009, Boies and Olson joined forces to overturn California’s
Proposition 8. More recently, Mr. Olson served as counsel for CNN in their press credential
argument with the Trump administration. 43 These elite lawyers have their pick of what cases and
issues they want to litigate, and I argue when public attention to an issue increases, they are more
likely to join litigation efforts related to that issue area.
Interest groups also carefully choose which legal cases they join. Generally, interest
groups influence representatives with campaign contributions or by mobilizing their large base of
support in the public (Bentley 1908). However, many interest groups also pursue legal and
litigation strategies, including sponsoring legal cases (Cigler, Loomis, and Nownes 2015) and
filing amicus briefs in cases of interest (Collins 2004). Interest groups need to push for specific
policy goals to show supporters they are active in the issues’ arena and maintain membership
(Walker 1983). Walker (1983) examines the creation and continued maintenance of interest
groups in the 20th century. Walker finds that interest groups need a constant issue to fight for or
against to survive. Interest groups which maintain strong allegiances with the public, especially
in terms of monetary donations, thrive. While most interest groups in Walker’s period of study
were founded by a wealthy patron, without continued public support, the interest group loses
clout in achieving policy goals. Further, Walker notes that “[w]ithout the influence of the patrons

Who is Ted Olson, the former Bush lawyer representing CNN and Acosta against the White House?
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/who-is-ted-olson-the-former-bush-lawyer-representing-cnn-and-acostaagainst-the-white-house
43
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of political action, the flourishing system of interest groups in the United States would be much
smaller” (Walker 1983, p. 404).
When a petition related to an issue area an interest group is concerned with is appealed to
the Supreme Court, the group often takes notice and decides if filing a brief is worth the cost
(Collins 2004; Cigler, Loomis, and Nownes 2015). Filing an amicus brief is a way of signaling to
the members of an interest group, and the public at large, that the organization is acting and
attempting to influence policy (Wasby 1995; Collins and Martinek 2010; Zuber, Sommer, and
Parent 2015). Interest groups can inform the justices of the harm or benefits of granting
certiorari or what repercussions may occur at the decision stage (Collins 2004, 2008). I argue
that if the public is paying more attention to the interest group or its issue area, the likelihood of
the group filing an amicus brief or petitioning the Court itself also increases.
Interest groups can both employ powerful private attorneys to argue their case and/or use
in house counsel. Certain interest groups (Planned Parenthood, the ACLU, the NRA, AARP,
etc.) are themselves powerful repeat players, even without a former S.G. representing their side.
Among non-governmental litigants, previous research finds that those who are well financed and
employ lawyers who are repeat players in front of the Supreme Court are the most likely to have
their petitions granted (Galanter 1974; Feldman and Kappner 2016).
5.5

Testing when Powerful Lawyers Act
I argue that A.G.s, S.G.s, and private repeat-players will be more likely to be a petitioner

or file an amicus brief if that petition relates to a publicly salient issue area than those that are
less salient. State A.G.s are motivated by a desire to please their constituents, and they also hold
aspirations of reaching higher elected office. Federal S.G.s are motivated by similar goals.
Federal S.G.s are part of the executive branch, and this branch wishes to be seen as active on
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publicly important issues. Additionally, I argue interest groups are likely to be part of salient
petitions out of a desire to tackle issues important to their members and maintain their reputation
of being active in important litigation.
5.5.1

Data & Dependent Variables
I utilize the same dataset as detailed in Chapter 4 with a new dependent variable. To

explore whether repeat players are influenced by public attention, I utilize a series of distinct
dependent variables. I first examine how public attention impacts the likelihood of a State or
Federal A.G./S.G. being the petitioner. My expectation is that an A.G./S.G. will be more likely to
petition the U.S. Supreme Court if public attention increases. The first dependent variable,
Government Attorney-Petitioner, is coded as 1 if a state A.G./S.G. or federal S.G. is the
petitioner of the petition and 0 otherwise.
The next model examines the link between public attention and the actions of powerful
private lawyers in appealing cases to the Supreme Court. Repeat Player-Petitioner is coded as 1
if a private attorney is the petitioner, and 0 otherwise. For each attorney, I count how many
petitions they have been a party to. If an attorney has been part of 20 petitions or more over the
2010-2017 time period, I deem them a repeat player. This scheme is similar to how Feldman and
Kappner (2016) determine repeat players in their work on the subject.
The final set of models investigates how public attention impacts the probability that an
A.G./S.G. or interest group will file an amicus brief before final certiorari decisions. It is well
documented that an increase in amicus briefs dramatically increases the likelihood the U.S.
Supreme Court will grant certiorari (Caldeira and Wright 1988; Provine 1980; Tanenhaus et al.
1963; Ulmer 1984). Further, amicus briefs from these government lawyers is known to influence
the Court at the merits stage of the process as well (Owens 2010). The dependent variables in
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this analysis capture the number of A.G.S.G. Amici and Interest Group Amici briefs filed prior to
certiorari for each petition. For, for the A.G./S.G. model, I removed instances where the U.S.
Supreme Court issued a Call for the Views of the Solicitor General (CVSG), a motion that
compels the U.S. Solicitor General to file an amicus brief, in addition to petitions where the
government was party to the case.
To perform this analysis, I again used the data collected on all petitions related to the
three issue areas chosen from 2010 through 2017. This data-set contains 160 petitions, including
the name of attorneys for both parties of all the petitions.
5.5.2

Independent Variables
I return to the public attention variable captured via Twitter, with the same three topic

areas of abortion, campaign finance, and anti-trust. Again, this measure captures how much the
public is talking about these issues on Twitter, each month, from 2010 through 2017,
standardized by the number of Twitter users.
As ideological distance between the U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts increases, the
likelihood the Supreme Court will grant certiorari to petitions originating from the ideologically
distant lower court also increases (Cameron, Segal, and Songer 2000; Black and Owens 2009;
Grant, Hendrickson, and Lynch 2012). While this project is examining how the public influences
actors known to influence the agenda, and not cert decisions, it is important to control for
ideological distance. In the introduction to this Chapter I outlined two similar abortion cases with
similar elements that should stand out to the justices. One, however, came from an ideologically
distant court, whereas the other did not.
To estimate the Ideological Distance between the Supreme Court and the lower circuits, I
rely on the Judicial Common Space measure from Epstein et al. 2007. The Judicial Common
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Space (J.C.S.) measure estimates the median ideological score for the Supreme Court and all 11
circuits plus D.C. I take the absolute value of the difference between these two medians per term,
and the resulting number is higher if the distance is farther and lower if the distance is not. This
ideological measure is the same as the one outlined in Chapter 4, which has more information on
its construction and range.
5.6

Results
The primary goal of this chapter is to examine the impact of public attention to issue

areas on powerful lawyers’ decisions to appeal a case or file amici briefs alongside petitions
related to those issues. Descriptive statistics of petitions related to abortion, campaign finance,
and anti-trust are displayed in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics
Topic
Abortion
Campaign Finance
Anti-Trust
Government Attorney
Government Attorney-Petitioner
Repeat Player
Repeat Player-Petitioner
Neither Repeat Player or AG/SG

N
20
26
114
59
15
25
12
76

Overall, anti-trust is the most petitioned issue area followed by campaign finance and
finally abortion. The amount per topic area is expected given how active corporations are in antitrust litigation, especially when compared to a major social issue like abortion or a relatively new
issue area of public concern, campaign finance. A Solicitor General or Attorney General was a
party in 59 of the 160 petitions, and the petitioner in 15 of these petitions. Repeat private
attorneys were a party to a petition in 25 instances, and the petitioner in 12 of these cases. Public
attention to these three issues ranged from hardly mentioned (0.003) to highly mentioned
(0.0149). A decimal representation of public attention may not be intuitive, but the difference
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between the low and high end is an order of magnitude. On the lower end of public attention
there is relatively little conversation (less than 10,000 Tweets on the topic) whereas on the upper
end there are millions of Tweets for that month.
First, I estimate how public attention impacts the likelihood of Attorneys General and
Solicitors General deciding to appeal a case to the U.S. Supreme Court. Table 5.2 provides
estimates of the logit model. Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, logit models are
appropriate. 44 The results for the model indicate a positive and significant influence of my key
independent variable of Public Attention. The more the public pays attention to an issue, the
more likely an A.G./S.G. will be the petitioner on a case related to this issue. Thus, when an
issue grows in attention among the public, it is more likely that an A.G./S.G. will be part of
appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court.
This result demonstrates a higher likelihood of participation from these powerful
government attorneys when an issue is important to the public.
Table 5.2: Public Attention & Government Attorneys
Government Attorney-Petitioner p-value
Public Attention
Ideological Distance
Constant
Observations

173.0
(75.09)
-0.327
(2.471)
-3.361
(0.932)

0.021
0.895
0.000

160
Standard errors in parentheses

Logit models determine positive and negative directions; however, the coefficients do not

For the second estimate, due to the low number of occurrences within the data, a range of estimates were used to
determine best fit. Estimates using a Firth logistic regression with rare events, a Rare-Events model (King and Zeng
2001), and Exact logistic regression (Leitgöb 2013) produce nearly identical results to a standard logistic model. For
ease of interpretation, a standard logit model is used.
44
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demonstrate substantive significance. To more fully explore the impact of public attention on
A.G./S.G. involvement, I generated adjusted predictions for the independent variable of interest,
Public Attention. Adjusted predictions specify values for each of the independent variables and
compute the probability of the event occurring for those instances. Therefore, I calculated the
probability of an A.G./S.G. being the petitioner at various values of the independent variables.
To observe the impact of Public Attention, I calculated adjusted predictions with Public
Attention at its minimum value. Ideological distance is held at its median. Figure 5.2 illustrates
the results. The x-axis displays various levels of public attention with 0. 000387 being the
minimum observed value, 0. 00585 the mean, and 0.014729 the maximum. Descriptively, the
mean demonstrates that when an A.G./S.G. is the petitioner there is more attention to the issue
given by the public.

Figure 5.2: Adjusted Predictions for Public Attention – A.G./S.G. as Petitioner
95% two-tailed confidence intervals for the adjusted prediction is reported in brackets.

Figure 5.2 demonstrates that as public attention to an issue area increases, the more likely
an A.G./S.G. is the petitioner in certiorari petition. When public attention is at its lowest value,
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there is a 0.058 probability of an A.G./S.G. being a petitioner for certiorari. At the mean, the
likelihood increases to 0.148. At the maximum value of public attention, this likelihood increases
to 0.44. Thus, when moving from the minimum to maximum value of public attention, there is a
74.1% increase in the likelihood of an A.G./S.G. being the petitioning lawyer.
This result shows a strong impact of public attention on the behavior of powerful
government attorneys. They are much more likely to be involved in a petition, arguing the
executive’s position (for the U.S. Solicitor General) or that of their state, if the public is widely
discussing the issue. Further, when public attention is high, and the A.G./S.G. lose in lower
courts, they are more likely to petition the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari, versus when they
lose in the lower court and public attention to the issue is low.
Next, I examine how public attention impacts the likelihood of private attorneys who are
repeat players in front of the U.S. Supreme Court to be party to a petition for certiorari. Table
5.3 provides estimates of this logit model.
Table 5.3: Public Attention & Private Repeat Players
Repeat Player Petitioner p-value
Public Attention
Ideological Distance
Constant
Observations

201.3
(68.01)
-1.011
(2.185)
-2.971
(0.808)

0.003
0.643
0.000

160
Standard errors in parentheses

Estimating the impact of public attention on private repeat players who are petitioners
again demonstrates a statistically significant and positively signed result. Like the earlier
A.G./S.G. estimates, the more attention the public pays to an issue area, the more likely a repeat
player will petition the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari.
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To illustrate the substantive impact of the second model’s analysis, I again calculate
adjusted predictions with Public Attention at its minimum value (0.000387) to its maximum
values (0.012059). Supreme Court ideological distance is held at its median. Figure 5.3 displays
the results of the adjusted predictions. When public attention to an issue area is low, the
probability a repeat player will petition the Court for certiorari is 3.6%. At the mean, or dashed
line in figure 2, the probability increases to 12.3%. At maximum public attention paid to an issue
area, the probability jumps to 30.6%.

Figure 5.3: Adjusted Probability for Public Attention – Repeat Player as Petitioner
95% two-tailed confidence intervals for the adjusted prediction is reported in brackets.

Finally, I examine how public attention impacts the likelihood of attorneys
general/solicitors general and interest groups filing an amicus brief before a certiorari decision.
For the first analysis examining A.G./S.G. amici filings, I exclude any petition where the
government is a party. This exclusion reduces the number of petitions in the model to 141. The
dependent variable is a count of the number of amicus filings made by a government attorney,
with some petitions receiving amicus briefs from more than one A.G./S.G.
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In the second model, the dependent variable notes if an interest group filed amicus curiae
before certiorari is decided. The variable is also a count, ranging from 0 to 11 amicus briefs filed
before cert. Due to the count nature of these dependent variables, a negative binomial regression
is used. 45 Table 5.4 provides results for both of these analyses.
The first model examines if public attention and ideological distance impact the
likelihood of an A.G./S.G. to file an amicus brief alongside a petition before certiorari is
decided. The estimate reveals a statistically significant and positive relationship between these
variables, with ideological distance not reaching significance. In other words, the more attention
an issue receives from the public, the more likely an A.G./S.G. will file an amicus brief. These
results, especially in combination with those reported in Table 5.2, suggest that the actions of
S.G.s and A.G.s are influenced by public attention to certain issues, as opposed to other
influences.
Table 5.4: Public Attention & Amicus Briefs before Certiorari
A.G./S.G. Amici p-value
Interest Group Amici
Public Attention
Ideological Distance
Constant
Observations

122.4
(71.92)
2.490
(2.135)
-2.562
(0.792)

0.089
0.244
0.001

141
Standard errors in parentheses

89.78
(31.85)
-0.296
(1.026)
-0.308
(0.362)

p-value
0.005
0.773
0.395

160

For substantive effects of the first model I generate adjusted predictions of the component
terms. At the minimum amount of public attention, the probability an A.G./S.G. will file a brief

A poisson goodness of fit test revealed that a poisson estimation would not be proper, and instead a negative
binomial is appropriate.
45
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is 0.19. At the mean amount of public attention, this probability increases to 0.25, and at the
maximum value there exists an 0.89 probability.
The second model in table 5.4 examines the same question, but the dependent variable
changes to interest group amicus brief filings. The results reveal that this relationship echoes
earlier findings: the more public attention an issue area receives, the more likely an interest
group will file an amicus brief. This finding increases our understanding of interest group
behavior and adds to existing literature which argues interest groups are interested in engaging
with salient issues to show activity to their members (Walker 1983).

Figure 5.4: Predicted Number of Amicus Briefs by Interest Groups
Substantively, the interest group model’s predicted number of briefs illustrated in Figure
5.4 highlights the potent effects of public attention. When public attention to an issue is low, less
than one amicus brief is predicted to be filed by an interest group. At the issue area’s average
amount, the predicted amount of amicus briefs increases to 0.989, almost reaching 1. At one
standard deviation higher than the mean amount of public attention, the predicted number of
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amicus briefs increases to 1.378. At the maximum amount of public attention, the predicted
number of amicus briefs filed before certiorari is decided increases to 1.972. Thus, as public
attention increases, the number of amicus briefs distinct interest groups will file in conjunction
with a petition also increases.
5.7

Conclusion
The results of this chapter indicate that for government attorneys and private repeat

players, an increase in public attention to an issue area significantly increases the probability
they will petition the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari. This chapter further finds that when an
A.G./S.G. is not party to a petition, they are more likely to file an amicus brief if there is more
public attention on the issue at hand. In addition, government attorneys and interest groups are
more likely to file amicus briefs on related cases before a certiorari decision is made when
public attention to an issue increases. Thus, the public has a demonstrable impact on important
actors outside of the U.S. Supreme Court. Outside actors such as interest groups or elected
attorneys have an incentive to tackle issues the public cares about, and this chapter shows that
they do so with respect to appeals decisions at the U.S. Supreme Court.
Previous work has argued interest groups must perform maintenance with their members
in order to survive and be effective. I believe these findings empirically demonstrate
maintenance in action from interest groups. Further, these findings show that, at least in some
way, powerful government attorneys attend to their constituents in deciding which cases to be a
part. This behavior makes intuitive sense from interest group and government actors’ point of
view, in addition to supporting previous findings in various literatures.
The ramifications of these findings indicate that there may be a measurable indirect
relationship between public attention to issue areas and the agenda of the U.S. Supreme Court. In
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the next and final empirical chapter, I bring together amici briefs, powerful actors, and public
attention to determine how all of it can influence the ultimate agenda of the U.S. Supreme Court.
I argue and find that public attention influences the decisions of key legal actors, and their
actions in turn shape the agenda of the U.S. Supreme Court.

78

6
6.1

CHAPTER 6: PUBLIC ATTENTION AND THE DISCUSS LIST

Introduction
Each year, the U.S. Supreme Court must whittle over 8,000 petitions for certiorari down

to approximately 100 that will be granted a hearing on the merits. A crucial step in this
winnowing process is the creation of the so-called “Discuss List.” Researchers do not know
definitively what is or is not on the discuss list. The reason for the difficulty in positively
identifying which petitions make the discuss list is due to no official reporting of this list from
the U.S. Supreme Court. Over time there have been few studies which can expressly identify
which petitions made the discuss list. Scholars have looked to docket books or papers from
retired justices to determine which petitions made the list (Ulmer et al. 1972; Provine 1980;
Caldeira and Wright 1990). For instance, Caldeira and Wright (1990) examine the 1982 term and
identify which petitions made the discuss list through notes from the docket books of Justice
William J. Brennan Jr. Outside of docket books or notes from past justices, there is no reliable
way to determine what exactly is on the discuss list.
Caldeira and Wright (1990) use the docket books from Justice Brennan to examine what
aspects of petitions increase the likelihood the Court will place them on the discuss list.
Variables such as U.S. being a party, lower court conflict, issue area (Civil Liberties), ideology,
and amicus curiae participation are tested. In short, the authors find that the U.S. Solicitor
General manages to land over 90% of the cases they are a part of placed on the discuss list, and
more amicus briefs further increase the likelihood of placement on the list.
Notably missing from earlier work on Supreme Court agenda setting is any real measure
of public opinion or public salience. Many scholars have attempted to account for salience and
how it impacts decision making on the merits. However, due to the difficulty in convincingly
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ascertaining what the public thinks about an issue at any given moment, its influence on
certiorari has largely been unstudied.
6.2

Granting or Denying Cert: Luck or Influence?
Given the small proportion of petitions granted certiorari in a term, it can appear that

one’s petition being granted is based on luck, which is how one former Supreme Court clerk
described the agenda setting process (Perry 1991). The clerks of the Supreme Court are involved
in the certiorari process, exerting their own influence on the justices they write memorandum
for. Generally, one clerk in the pool drafts a memo for each petition, then, that memo is
distributed to the other justices who participate in the pool. Some justices ask their personal
clerks to review these memos, others skip this step, but generally the justices themselves focus
on the memos instead of reading each petition (Perry 1991). Scholars have identified many
aspects of a petition that “stick out” and gain the attention of the justices. Petitions that attract
interest group support, receive amicus curiae briefs, cite a conflict among lower courts, and have
powerful attorneys as a party are more likely to gain the attention of the Court (Caldeira and
Wright 1988; Provine 1980; Tanenhaus et al. 1963; Ulmer 1984; Bailey, Kamoie, and Maltzman
2005; Wolfarth 2009; Owens 2010)..
I argue increased public attention can also cause external actors to change their behavior,
filing amici briefs or petitioning the Court for certiorari when they otherwise would not. The
justices and clerks at the U.S. Supreme Court are likely not considering what is currently popular
on social media while writing memos or deciding which petitions to grant cert. However, the
Court needs legitimacy from the public to operate and cannot enforce decisions alone, meaning
opinions of other government institutions and the public are likely considered (Caldeira 1986;
Caldeira and Gibson 1992; Gibson and Caldeira 1998; Ignagni and Meernik 1994; Bailey,
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Kamoie, and Maltzman 2005; Hettinger and Zorn 2005; Curry, Pacelle, and Marshall 2008; Hall
2014; Gibson and Nelson 2015). I posit that when an issue is highly salient among the public,
this salience influences others surrounding the Court, indirectly increasing the likelihood of
petitions related to salient issue areas being discussed longer/placed on the discuss list. With high
public attention surrounding an issue area, government attorneys take notice and file amicus
briefs or become counsel themselves to the petition. In addition, interest groups sponsor
litigation or file amicus briefs to push forward their policy preference and engage in maintenance
of their membership base.
Either due to concerns about maintaining their legitimacy, replacement of justices, or
wanting to tackle issues the public cares about, the Court generally tracks with public opinion at
the merits stage. Some argue the mechanism for why the Court tends to follow public opinion at
the merits stage is due to replacement of justices over time (Norpoth and Segal 1994; Giles,
Blackstone and Vining 2008), or due to constraints perceived from other elected branches
(Chutkow 2008; Harvey and Friedman 2009). The public elects the president who selects future
justices, as well as the senators who confirm them. Thus, the installation of a new justice would
then be reflective of public opinion at that time. Others argue public opinion produces a real
constraint on judicial decision making at the merits stage, regardless of changes in composition
of the justices (Mishler and Sheehan 1993; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995; Hurwitz,
Mishler, and Sheehan 2004; McGuire and Stimson 2004; Casillas, Enns and Wohlfarth 2011).
While I argue the Court spends more time on petitions regarding a salient issue area
because of outside actor’s influence, the Justices and their clerks are part of society. It is a
reasonable assumption they are aware what issues are salient to the public at any given time, too
(Caldeira and Wright 1990; Giles, Blackstone, and Vining 2008; Baum 2009; Fix 2014). Thus,
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the combination of more amicus briefs, participation from powerful attorneys, and their own
sense of what the public is attentive to, I argue and expect the Court will spend more time on
petitions when the issue is salient.
6.3

Testing Public and Supreme Court Attention
Like other chapters in this dissertation, I rely on petition data gathered between the 2010

through 2017 terms to test how public attention impacts the attention, or time, given to each
petition by the U.S. Supreme Court. After gathering the petitions during my time of interest, I
identify all cases that fall into my three topic areas of interest: abortion, anti-trust, or campaign
finance. In total, 12,016 paid petitions are gathered with 160 petitions specifically related to the
selected three issue areas.
6.3.1

Capturing Increased Attention to Petitions by the Supreme Court
Given the difficulty in knowing exactly which petitions make the discuss list, I determine

how much time the Court spent deliberating on a petition as a proxy for attention given to a
petition by the U.S. Supreme Court. I must first demonstrate the relationship between discussion
time and the likelihood of certiorari being granted. To calculate the time devoted to each
petition, I count the number of days from the date of first distribution to conference to the date
when the petition receives a final decision. The date of first distribution marks the day in which
the petition has cleared procedural hurdles and is given to the justices for consideration. 46 On
conclusion day, the justices announce whether the petition has been granted certiorari or denied.
Descriptive analyses reveal that denied petitions are discussed for an average of 49 days. When
the Court grants certiorari, however, the average number of discussion days jumps to 109 days.

Another potential starting date could be the date of filing for each petition. However, the Court will at times take a
recess, and those petitions stagnate during this break. Thus, using the date of distribution gives a more reliable
measure of how long each petition was being discussed.
46
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To more systematically establish that Days Discussed provides a reasonable proxy for
petitions that received increased attention from the Court during the certiorari process, I estimate
the factors that influence the likelihood of a petition being granted certiorari. I control for other
variables known to influence certiorari outcomes, such as the ideological distance between the
USSCT and the lower court, the number of amicus briefs, and Solicitor General involvement;
these variables are all measured in the same manner as explained in previous chapters.
The dependent variable in this initial analysis, Certiorari Granted, is dichotomous, coded
as one (1) if the petition was granted certiorari, and zero (0) if denied. Due to the dichotomous
nature of the dependent variable, a logistic estimation is appropriate. I expect all independent
variables to be positive and significant, reinforcing past work. Days Discussed should also be
positive and significant, indicating more attention from the Court results in a higher likelihood of
a petition being granted. The results are reported in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Determinants of Certiorari
VARIABLES
Certiorari Granted p-value
Ideological Distance
Amicus curiae
Days Discussed
A.G./S.G. Petitioner
Constant

0.482
(0.311)
0.347
(0.025)
0.007
(0.0005)
1.556
(0.193)
-3.409
(0.116)

0.109
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Observations
8,142
Standard errors in parentheses
The results from this estimation has some interesting findings. First, past findings noting
the impact of amicus briefs and powerful government attorneys holds, with both variables
showing a positive and statistically significant influence on the outcome of a petition.
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Surprisingly, the ideological distance between the U.S. Supreme Court and the lower court is not
significant.
Days Discussed is positive and significant, however, indicating that the more time the
justices spend deliberating a petition, the more likely they are to ultimately grant certiorari. To
demonstrate the substantive impact of the Days Discussed variable, I generate predictive margins
at a number of points with the other variables held at their mean or median when appropriate.
Figure 1 illustrates the results.

Figure 6.1: Likelihood of Petition Granted Certiorari
When a petition is discussed for the minimum amount of days (one), the probability of
certiorari being granted is 4.3%. At the mean amount for denied petitions, 49 days (the dashed
line), the probability is 5.2%. When discussed for the average amount of days of granted
petitions, or 109 days (the solid line), the probability rises to 9.8% - a near 100% increase in
probability. At the maximum amount of days discussed, the likelihood of certiorari being
granted jumps to 82%. It should be noted, however, that it is exceedingly rare for a petition to be

84

discussed less than 18 days or more than 150 days, as 95% of all petitions are discussed within
an 18 to 150-day window.
These results suggest that Days Discussed provides a reasonable proxy for which cases
receive more attention from the Court; further, those petitions receiving more attention are
significantly more likely to be granted certiorari. Given how few cases are ultimately granted
certiorari, distinguishing how long a petition was under advisement provides some signals as to
the “cert-worthiness” of the petition. Those that are discussed for a greater period of time have a
greater likelihood of being granted; those that are considered for only a short period of time are
much more likely to have not even made it on to the discuss list and instead been routinely
dismissed. With this connection between discussion days and certiorari established, we now
move to the main analysis of this chapter: investigating whether and to what degree public
attention indirectly influences the Court’s certiorari process.
6.4

Heckman Selection Model
To test my argument that public attention indirectly influences the agenda of the U.S.

Supreme Court, I use a two-stage Heckman (1979) selection model. A Heckman selection model
captures my theoretical arguments appropriately, and is an excellent estimator given the
truncated nature of my data (petitions related to the three topic areas) in the first stage. Here,
previous studies, as well as results presented in Chapter 4 and 5, show that more amici briefs and
the presence of powerful attorneys increase the likelihood of certiorari being granted. However,
most analyses of certiorari decision-making skip over the question of what distinguishes
petitions that receive more amici filings or garner powerful attorneys. I argue – and show in
previous chapters – that public attention influences whether actors appeal certain petitions, and
whether they choose to file amici briefs. I further posit that these strategic litigation decisions
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subsequently influence which cases receive increased attention from the Court during the
certiorari process, thereby highlighting an indirect mechanism through which public attention
helps crafts the Court’s agenda. Thus, a Heckman two-stage model captures the dual phases this
theory proposes: it first takes into account the public’s influence on amici filings, interest groups,
and powerful lawyers, and then accounts for how those variables influence the length of time the
Court spends deliberating each petition.
When running a Heckman selection model, there are two dependent variables, one for
each stage. To account for the impact public attention has on powerful actors both in petitioning
the Court and filing amicus briefs, I run two separate Heckman models; one for each variable
shown to have an impact on the length of time the Court deliberates a petition. The first stage of
both models estimates the impact public attention has on the two dependent variables in
question. One estimates the number of amici briefs filed before certiorari is decided and the
other estimates if a state or federal A.G./S.G. or repeat player is the petitioner. I combine
government lawyers and private repeat players due to a low number of petitions with a
government lawyer as petitioner and high public attention. The second dependent variable for all
three models is Days Discussed.
6.4.1

Independent Variables included in Heckman selection model
The primary independent variable of interest is my measure of public attention to

abortion, campaign finance, and anti-trust. I argue this is a latent variable which influences
outside actors to file an amicus brief or petition the Court for certiorari. I do not expect, nor do I
find, public attention to directly influence how long the justices spend deliberating a petition.
However, I do expect and find that public attention increases the likelihood of others taking
action, which in turn affects the discussion-time dependent variable. Thus, public attention

86

illuminates how public mediates the actions of important actors surrounding the Court, and how
those actions in turn help craft the Court’s agenda.
The remaining variables include the ideological distance between the Supreme Court and
circuit courts, if an A.G./S.G. was the petitioner, and if the U.S. Solicitor General or state A.G.
file an amicus brief before certiorari. I include ideological distance and in both stages of the
model. The variables for U.S. Solicitor General filing an amicus brief and state A.G./S.G. amici
briefs are included in only the second stage for empirical and theoretical reasons. There must be
differentiation between the independent variables in both stages, and, using an independent
variable such as USSG amici filings before certiorari to then predict amici filings before cert is
inappropriate as it would be predicting the same thing.
6.5

Results
Table 6.2 reports the results of the first Heckman selection model testing the impact of

public attention on amicus filings before certiorari is decided. Overall, the model performs well
with a significant result for both the chi squared and likelihood ratio tests. The results support my
argument of an indirect impact of public attention on discussion days. When the amount of
Public Attention an issue area receives increases, outside actors are more likely to file amicus
briefs on petitions related to that issue before certiorari, and the Court is then subsequently likely
to spend more days discussing those petitions. Similar to Scott’s (2006) findings, and mirroring
the results shown in Table 6.1, ideological distance between the Supreme Court and lower Courts
is insignificant. In the second stage, only amicus briefs filed by state or federal attorneys general
or solicitors general have an impact on the amount of time the Court spends deliberating a
petition.
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Table 6.2: Indirect Impact of Public Attention on Days Discussed; Amici Briefs
2nd Stage
1st Stage
Days Discussed p-value # Amici before Cert p-value
Ideological Distance
A.G./S.G. Petitioner
USSG Amici
State A.G./S.G. Amici
Public Attention
Constant

13.68
(59.22)
33.21
(26.56)
156.3
(32.98)
-19.54
(7.375)

0.817

69.25
(28.51)

0.015

0.211
0.000

-0.066
(0.726)
0.568
(0.511)

0.928

82.34
(28.43)
-0.235
(0.262)

0.004

0.267

0.008

Observations
160
160
Prob > χ2 = 0.0001
Heckman Two-Stage Selection model - Standard errors in parentheses
The next estimation is similar to the above, but instead of selecting on amicus briefs and
public attention, I select on if an influential repeat player (both government attorney and/or a
private repeat player) are the petitioner. Table 6.3 reports the results of this estimation; however,
the overall model statistics are not as positive as the amicus brief model as the chi squared
estimation is 0.4025. Even with a low p-value, likely due to the small sample size, there is likely
connection between public attention, powerful lawyers, and discussion days if the N increased.
The results in Table 6.3 are again in line with expectations and show a demonstrable influence of
public attention on powerful litigants, if not a strongly significant one. The more public attention
an issue area receives, the more likely a state or federal A.G./S.G. or private repeat player will
petition the Supreme Court with a case related to that salient issue area.
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Table 6.3: Indirect Impact of Public Attention on Days Discussed; Repeat Players
2nd Stage
1st Stage
Days Discussed p-value Repeat-Player Petitioner p-value
Ideological Distance
# Amici Before Cert
Public Attention
Constant

127.8
(104.0)
-3.953
(6.168)

0.219

14.79
(50.31)

0.769

0.522

-1.216
(0.949)

0.2

180.1
(31.18)
-1.149
(0.326)

0.000
0.000

Observations
160
160
Prob > χ2 = 0. 4025
Heckman Two-Stage Selection model - Standard errors in parentheses
Taken together, these results demonstrate that public attention is a latent variable
influencing the decisions of powerful actors outside of the Court. The more the public talks about
an issue area, the more likely the Court will receive amicus briefs alongside petitions related to
that issue area. And, the powerful litigants (such as the A.G./S.G.) that we know have an
outsized impact are more likely to be the petitioner of a case pertaining to issue areas attracting
public attention.
The reason outside actors are likely to take action is clear: government attorneys have an
electoral incentive, either through their own election (in the states) or due to a desire to tackle
popular issues from the executive branch (federal). Further, interest groups who wish to see
policy implemented in a specific manner, and must also engage in essential group maintenance,
are incentivized to prepare amicus briefs or retain a well-known private attorney to litigate a case
when the public is paying more attention to an issue area within their arena. This activity from
interest groups shows its members that the interest group is taking action, and because of the
influence of amici briefs and well-known attorneys at both the certiorari and merits stages, it is a
meaningful way to influence policy at the national level.
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6.6

Conclusion
Public attention is a latent variable affecting which petitions receive more attention from

the Court because of the actions taken by outside actors. The number of amici briefs filed before
cert and the presence of a government attorney as a petitioner both increase the likelihood of a
petition being granted. Further, the number of days spent discussing a petition also positively
increases the likelihood of certiorari being granted, suggesting the Court spends more time on
these petitions, perhaps even placing them on the discuss list. The number of days a petition is
discussed is an important variable and given results here, it could be useful for future research in
this topic area. While the final cert decision is not a focus here, others who are studying what
goes into the Court’s cert decisions could find Days Discussed of value.
The data demonstrates the relationship between days discussed and the likelihood of
certiorari being granted, including which variables affect a petition’s ability to garner more
attention, or days, from the Court. Two two-stage models uncover a potential latent influence of
public attention on the important days discussed variable. I find that public attention has a
positive and significant influence on the number of amicus briefs filed before certiorari, and
those briefs then positively influence the number of days discussed. I find that the same holds for
powerful actors such as state or federal attorneys general or solicitors general. The impact of the
public on repeat players also exits, although I was not able to achieve significance in this
estimation. The more public attention an issue area receives, the more likely one of these
powerful litigants will petition the Supreme Court to hear a case related to the issue area. The
reason for outside actors to act relies largely on their electoral or membership incentives to do so.
Government attorneys want to handle cases related to issues the public is widely discussing, and
interest groups wish to show their members they are working to influence policy.
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In the next and final chapter, I review the work done throughout this dissertation and note
potential expansions of this line of research along with some limitations. The concluding chapter
summarizes my findings and discusses their broader implications.

91

7
7.1

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

Overall Findings and Implications
This project began by asking a simple question: does the public influence the U.S.

Supreme Court’s agenda? In answering this question, I created new measures, scraped thousands
of petitions, and put forward new theories to explain why I thought the public had an impact.
This project is expanding on decades of research demonstrating the positive impact amicus briefs
and powerful litigants have on the likelihood of a petition receiving more attention from the
Court or being granted certiorari. By using a new measure of public attention, I show that these
powerful outside actors are themselves influenced by the public, and thus, indirectly, the public
has an impact on the agenda of the U.S. Supreme Court. Understanding the relationship between
the public and the courts outside actors, a view of American democracy becomes clearer, and
with the increasing ubiquity of social media, the new mechanism by which the public can make
their concerns known, understanding this important relationship becomes paramount.
In this concluding chapter I first highlight how the data gathered for this project was
collected. I hope that in explaining my methods, it might encourage others to try their hand at
coding and looking outside what they are comfortable with to tackle new research ideas. I then
review my theory, findings, and outline future work.
Throughout this dissertation, I argue increased public attention to an issue can alter the
behavior of influential actors surrounding the U.S. Supreme Court. In Chapter 2, I detailed my
theory. I argued that powerful litigants and interest groups have a vested interest in tackling
issues the public cares about. Powerful government attorneys often have electoral reasons for
engaging in litigation their constituents care about, and interest groups must maintain themselves
by being active in policy formation. Thus, powerful litigants such as the solicitor general,

92

attorneys general, private repeat players, and interest groups are more likely to submit an amici
brief, and more likely to appeal their case to the U.S. Supreme Court public attention for a
petitions issue is high. Public attention influences powerful actors to engage a problem they may
have otherwise not.
In Chapter 3 I argued that a new measure to is needed to accurately gauge what the public
is talking about. In the past, surveys or newspaper data-sets were used in an attempt to get at
what is important to the public. In the last ten years there has been a technological renaissance,
dramatically altering how people communicate. Every technological advancement changes how
the public debates with itself. From town squares to the written word and most recently radio and
television, we constantly invent new, faster ways to communicate. With social media being the
prominent method of discussion today, I argue it is the most appropriate place to harvest
information about the public conversation. This chapter argued that the pervasiveness of social
media means that conversations online are not a sample of the public’s conversation, but the
actual, entire conversation. Thus, capturing what the public is talking about online is capturing
what the public is talking about overall.
In chapter 4, I explicitly tested how public attention influences the likelihood of outside
actors to file amicus briefs. I find that when public attention surrounding an issue increases, more
amicus curiae briefs are filed before a certiorari decision is decided. In addition, influential
attorneys and interest groups are more likely to file a brief or be party to the petition when public
attention is high. Specifically, when public attention is low, there is a low probability that a
petition related to that issue will receive an amicus brief. However, when public attention
increases, the probability also increases. Overall, I find that a petition dealing with a highly
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talked about issue area can expect to receive four or more amicus briefs – a healthy and
substantial amount.
This project also contributes to our understanding of what prompts powerful attorneys
and interest groups to act. Chapter 5 empirically tested how public attention influences these
organizations and individuals. When public attention increases, the likelihood powerful attorneys
or interest groups will petition the Court or write amicus briefs increases. The public has a
demonstrable effect on important actors outside of the U.S. Supreme Court. Outside actors such
as interest groups or elected attorneys have an interest in tackling issues the public cares about,
and this chapter shows there is an effect of public attention.
The final empirical chapter brought together both S.G. involvement and amicus briefs
with public attention to examine how much attention the Court gives each petition before
deciding its fate. I use time spent deliberating each petition as a variable to quantify how much
attention the Court gives each petition. I find that in general, the more attention (time spent) the
Court gives a petition, the higher the likelihood they will grant certiorari. This chapter uses a
two-stage model to show that as public attention increases, both amicus briefs and government
attorney involvement also increase, which then leads to more attention paid by the justices. Thus,
there is an indirect influence of public attention on the agenda of the U.S. Supreme Court.
For decades scholars have known that amicus briefs and government attorney
participation positively influence the likelihood a petition will be granted certiorari. However,
few have explicitly studied what influences the actors to act. Overall, this project finds that
another influence exists that can encourage powerful entities and offices in the legal world to
take action: public attention. The findings throughout this dissertation have shown an indirect
influence from what the public is talking about and how important actors surrounding the Court
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behave. If the public is particularly attentive to an issue, we should expect petitions related to
that issue to receive more amicus briefs, more engagement from top lawyers, and more time in
deliberation in conference. If public law scholars care to understand how interest groups and
attorneys such as the Solicitor General are influenced to take action, this project should be a
helpful entry into the literature.
Less specifically, this dissertation shows that there are new ways to tackle old questions
to produce new research. Knowing that public attention influences some of the most elite, most
powerful actors in our government is an interesting finding. While it makes intuitive sense that
the public should, of course, impact people that they elect or donate money to, that has been
historically difficult to show empirically. Many argue that the powerful in the halls of
government are relatively immune from public undulation, but this research should give pause to
that line of thinking. There is now strong theoretical and empirical reason to expect the public’s
attention to drive political and judicial action.
While I was not able to gather more than three topic areas for this project, collecting
more, similar data and applying it to new questions will open a large area of research. I believe if
one were to obtain more data about what the public is talking about in specific issue area
categories, the methods used here can greatly expand our understanding in many different areas
of political science or any discipline that has an interest in what the public is concerned with.
Potentially even create predictive models well ahead of the decision of the Court to grant cert.
Where past research has always been post-facto, future research and data with predictive
capability has nearly limitless potential to increase our understanding.
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7.2

Future Work
Future projects related to certiorari can build on this work by expanding the number of

issue areas with public conversation amounts. Given the universe of petitions is readily available
via web scraping, gathering as many issue areas as possible would give a better picture of how
influential the public is to outside actors, and ultimately the Court
Scholars from many different disciplines can use the methods outlined here to help test
new theories. While this project focuses on the actors surrounding the agenda-setting process of
the U.S. Supreme Court, the same data can be put toward a multitude of other areas. Knowing
how much the public is paying attention to an issue area can be used to examine how the public
impacts the other institutions of government. Does public attention have an impact on when and
what type of legislation is introduced, in executive order creation, or in voting patterns of
members of Congress? Additionally, exporting the methods used here and applying them to the
states or to other countries would produce a treasure of interesting research. Finding if these
results hold up in the states where judges are elected or in countries with entirely different
institutional designs. Data from social media can be tagged to specific locations and doing so
would even enable researchers to determine how public attention impacts local institutions,
politics, and elections.
In closing, the findings presented here are more than changes in probability of an amicus
brief being filed or predicting if the S.G. will become involved in a petition. Much of public law,
and political science in general teaches that the Court is a special institution, insulated from
public opinion. This insulation allows the Court, in theory, to make decisions that are right and
not necessarily popular. Indeed, our undergraduate textbooks read “Because Judges are unelected
and serve for life, they are not accountable to the people in the same way that presidents and
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members of Congress are” (Geer, Schiller, Segal, and Glencross 2013, p. 514) and “The
powerful role of the courts in a democracy will always be vexing for a simple reason: the courts
are designed to serve as a check, ultimately, on ‘We, the People’” (Morone and Kersh 2013, p.
605). Yes, the Court is relatively insulated, but the public may have more of an impact than we
previously thought on the judicial branch, and, on many different facets of our republic.
With social media as a method of communication beginning to mature and the
accessibility of powerful programing techniques, there are new and exciting tools available to
scholars. Previously it would have been near impossible to gauge what the public was talking
about in real time, or, being able to gather the universe of Supreme Court petitions in a
reasonable amount of time. It is my hope that future work will continue this type of outside the
box data collection and using it to help all of us more fully understand how our world works, and
how it is changing. I believe this dissertation is an important step in showcasing how new
methods can illuminate old questions.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
Figure A.1 illustrates the total number of amicus curiae filings per term from 2010
through 2017. Note that 2017 is lower than average due to a number of petitions not yet decided
when data was collected.
Appendix A.1

Figure A.1: Total Amicus Curiae filings per term
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Appendix B
When estimating a model using a count dependent variable, one must first determine
which estimator is appropriate. If the variable is normally disbursed, a Poisson model can be an
appropriate estimator. However, when the count variable contains an excessive number of zeros,
a determination must be made between a negative binomial or zero-inflated estimation. Both a
negative binomial and zero-inflated handle over-dispersion of zeros in different ways. A negative
binomial is similar to Poisson regression since it contains the same mean structure as Poisson
regression, but it has an extra parameter to model the over-dispersion.
A zero-inflated regression attempts to account for the extra zeros by determining which
are zeros because they cannot be anything else, and which ones are “true” zeros. For example,
say a researcher is interested in alcohol consumption. The researcher may collect data from
patrons leaving a restaurant, asking each person how many drinks they consumed. In addition,
the researcher askes each respondent how many friends they went with, their age, how many
children were in the party, and if they drove. The count variable, number of drinks, may have an
inflated number of zeros due to other circumstances. If the respondent was the designated driver
or children were present, he or she might have never intended to drink alcohol. Therefore, there
would be an over-dispersion of zeros in the data. A zero-inflated model essentially runs a
negative binomial model, and then a logit model. The logit model is attempting to predict when
the zeros would always be zero. Zero inflated estimations are helpful if ones data-set contains a
variable believed to predict a zero in their count.
In this particular situation where I am concerned with estimating the number of amicus
briefs a petition may receive, I do not have a variable which I believe would predict a zero.
Further, negative binomial models generally perform better when using smaller data-sets. Given
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these considerations, and that the zero-inflated and negative binomial report similar findings, I
selected the negative binomial. The results of the zero-inflated negative binomial with robust
standard errors are presented in Table B.1.
With no variable I thought could predict when a petition would receive an amicus brief, I
inflated the constant. I did model multiple iterations with several other variables inflated, and
Public Attention never dropped below standard levels of statistical significance.
Appendix B.1
Table B.1: Determinants of Amicus curiae before Certiorari
Amici Before Cert
p-value
Public Attention
91.507
0.001
(26.673)
Ideological Distance
-0.07
0.932
(.819)
SG Party to Case
0.548
0.298
(0.527)
Constant
-0.093
0.758
(0.302)
Inflate
Constant
-14.4
0.000
(1.78)
Alpha Log
0.307
0.181
(0.231)
Observations
160

Prob > χ2 = 0.002
Robust Standard errors in parentheses – Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial
Prob > χ2 = 0.002
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Appendix C
Below are the Boolean phrases I used to collect data on the three chosen topic areas. The
terms used are intentionally narrow as I wanted to be certain I was collecting data on these
specific issue areas and not others.
•

Abortion: (abortion OR "pro life" OR "pro choice") place_country:us

•

Campaign Finance: ("Citizens United v. FEC" OR "Citizens United" OR
"Campaign Finance" OR "Campaign Finance reform" OR "Dark money" OR
"Money in politics" OR pac OR pacs OR "Super PAC" OR "Super PACs")
place_country:us

•

Anti-trust: ("corporate monopolies" OR "antitrust" OR "anti-trust" OR "anti trust"
OR "corporate monopoly" OR "business monopolies" OR "business monopoly")
place_country:us

